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ABSTRACT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s application of varying tiers of scrutiny to different constitutional rights
has been widely criticized for severing rights from any clear connection with justice. One school
of thought holds that this could be cured by importing or expanding the role for “proportionality
analysis” in U.S. constitutional rights doctrines. American proponents of proportionality such as
Jamal Greene, Vicki Jackson, and Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer have argued that U.S.
courts could more transparently respect the connection between rights and justice by following
the example of Canadian courts in reasoning about the proportionality of laws as “justified
infringements” of rights. Furthermore, proportionality analysis, a kind of “intermediate scrutiny
for all,” is thought to foster a more reasonable and democratic rights discourse.
This Article argues that proportionality analysis may not be the cure its American proponents
hope for. Comparisons between American and Canadian constitutional rights cases suggest that
proportionality style reasoning conceptually devalues and distorts the connection between rights
and justice. In contrast, the alternative concept of rights as absolute relations of justice appears
to more transparently value constitutional rights.
The Article then turns to the prospective institutional effects of proportionality in the American
context. A rough sketch shows that the concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately
override rights appears to be as scattered across different American doctrines and tiers of scrutiny
as the concept of specifying the scope of rights absolutely. The mixed record of proportionality
in U.S. rights doctrines recommends drawing comparisons to Canada, where proportionality is
employed under a uniform doctrine. Comparing the effects of proportionality in the U.S. and
Canada indicates that this approach institutionally disrupts the democratic settlement of rights
disagreements in three ways. First, proportionality analysis appears to inflate the number of rights
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conflicts and intensify the rhetoric of those seeking to vindicate them. Second, in many cases
proportionality undermines the classic justification for entrenching rights in law and subjecting
them to independent judicial review by allowing rights to be overridden according to the moral
reasoning of judges. Third, hopes that proportionality might lead to more democratic dialogues
negotiating the meaning of rights between courts and legislatures should be checked by how the
use of proportionality analysis by Canadian courts has discouraged legislative responsibility for
constructing rights. Interestingly, at least one prominent American example (Employment
Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act) suggests that treating rights as
absolute trumps can encourage legislative responsibility for constructing the scope of rights.
These conclusions are primarily negative, but the Article ends with two positive lessons: The first
lesson is that rights should be thought of as absolute trumps, even if they are subject to reasonable
disagreement about the scope of their requirements. The second lesson is that ordinary statutory
rights, such as the rights articulated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, should be
recognized as potentially contributing to the scope of absolute constitutional rights. This could
help promote a more democratically reasonable way for American institutions to settle
disagreements about rights. These lessons could help reform the devaluations, distortions, and
disruptions afflicting both American and Canadian rights jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Talk of American exceptionalism can be overblown, but U.S.
constitutional rights jurisprudence is exceptional for eschewing one
overarching standard for balancing rights. That is, it lacks a uniform doctrinal
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test for balancing the interests protected by rights against broader social goals
and values. While the U.S. experience with the judicial review of
constitutional rights has run far longer than that of Europe or the
Commonwealth, American courts have been comparatively more hesitant to
embrace the idea that rights should be balanced for their ‘proportionality’ with
other interests and values related to impugned laws. American courts have
avoided adopting a uniform standard for analyzing proportionate “limitations”
on rights such as the Canadian Supreme Court’s Oakes test that guides
Canadian courts to assess the legitimacy (i.e. importance), suitability (i.e.
rational connection), necessity (i.e. minimal impairment), and balancing (in
the stricter sense of weighing interests) of the state’s “infringements” of
constitutional rights. 1 This exceptionalism raises at least two important
questions: First, to what extent does the lack of a uniform standard of
proportionality analysis really insulate American rights jurisprudence from the
practice of reasoning about proportionate infringements of rights? Second, to
what extent is it desirable for American rights adjudication to join the rest of
the world’s courts in using proportionality analysis as a way of protecting
constitutional rights?
These questions are entangled in disputes about how to diagnose and cure
the problems facing the American approach to constitutional rights. Nearly
everyone thinks that something ails American rights jurisprudence, but one
prominent camp of scholars and judges think that many of its pathologies can
be traced to the exceptional hesitancy of U.S. courts to engage in the kind of
proportionality analysis of rights-claims that is ubiquitous in Canadian and
European constitutional law. This camp argues that although there may be
elements of proportionality analysis in the doctrines U.S. courts use to assess
claims concerning different rights, overall these doctrines tends to preclude
balancing rights as interests against other goals and principles. They also claim
that because many of the difficulties of American rights jurisprudence can be
traced to this tendency to eschew or hide balancing rights, a heavy dose of the
modern type of proportionality review practiced in Canada and Europe could
reinvigorate its rights doctrines. American proponents of proportionality have
recently offered a number of impressive arguments to advance their claims.
1

PAUL YOWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN: MORAL AND
EMPIRICAL REASONING IN JUDICIAL REVIEW 16–18 (2018). The leading case in Canada on the
proportionality inquiry is R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 (Can.). Id. at 16 n.12.
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For example, in his recent essay, Rights as Trumps?, Professor Jamal
Greene provides a thoughtful diagnosis of U.S. rights jurisprudence and
makes the case for importing proportionality analysis into its doctrines. 2 He
argues that the American approach to rights jurisprudence is largely
dominated by the “categorical” framework of understanding rights as “trumps”
that are “absolute but for the exceptional circumstances in which they may be
limited.” 3 Of course, he keenly notes that U.S. courts do not apply this rightsas-trumps framework to all rights and circumstances in the same way. To the
more normative question, Greene argues that this American approach to
rights-as-trumps may be justified in extreme cases of “government bigotry,
intolerance, or corruption[,]” but also that the dominance of the rights-astrumps framework has distorted the ability of Americans to appreciate the
reasonable character of many of their disagreements about rights and to
resolve them democratically. 4
Greene is joined in making these claims by other scholars such as Vicki
Jackson, who argues Canadian style proportionality analysis could help
American courts achieve “transparency,” “bring constitutional law closer to
constitutional justice[,]” build a “better bridge between courts and other
branches of government,” and reveal “process failures” such as government
partiality. 5 Greene and Jackson’s arguments echo earlier calls by U.S.
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer to promote the “active liberty” of
democratic self-government by assessing the proportionality of the costs of
restricting rights with their benefits. 6
These arguments are highly relevant to pressing issues in American rights
jurisprudence. Consider how claims about proportionality reasoning have

2

3
4
5

6

Jamal Greene, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term–Foreword: Rights as Trumps?, 132 HARV. L. REV.
28, 38 (2018).
Id. at 30.
Id. at 78–79,128.
Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality, 124 YALE L.J. 3094, 3103 (2015).
See also Donald L. Beschle, No More Tiers? Proportionality as an Alternative to Multiple Levels of
Scrutiny in Individual Rights Cases, 38 PACE L. REV. 384, 385 (2018) (asserting that the adoption of
proportionality analysis based on the Canadian model will allow for a more coherent approach to
cases involving individual rights); ALEC STONE SWEET & JUD MATHEWS, PROPORTIONALITY
BALANCING AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNANCE 119–20 (2019) (providing an example of how
the Canadian parliament’s public record of proportionality analysis bolstered an act’s status as
constitutional).
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY 44 (2008).
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been related to the arguments the U.S. Supreme Court heard in the case of
New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York. 7 That case
turned in part on whether New York City’s (now repealed) ban on transporting
licensed, locked, and unloaded handguns to homes or shooting ranges outside
of the city violates the “text, history, and tradition” of the Second
Amendment’s right to bear arms. 8 Incorporating proportionality into
American rights doctrine along the lines advocated by Greene, Jackson, and
Breyer could have recommended treating this Second Amendment rights
claim as subject to something like intermediate scrutiny that balances the
particular interests of New York City against the interests of gun owners. 9
Greene in particular advocates for proportionality as “a kind of intermediate
scrutiny for all[.]” 10 It has been argued that balancing these interests
proportionately could have upheld the ban, or struck it down without
disturbing the balancing evident in other cases. 11 In contrast, some critics of
proportionality who think that the U.S. tiers of scrutiny approach to rights is
already laden with proportionality assessments have characterized Second
Amendment cases such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n as a chance to
abandon tiers of scrutiny in favor of defining the scope of rights in relation to
the “text, history, and tradition of the Constitution.” 12 Conclusions about
whether rights are or should be proportionately balanced under different tiers
of scrutiny will significantly shape how American courts assess rights-claims,
even beyond the Second Amendment.
The questions of what role proportionality plays or should play in
American rights jurisprudence invite us to look abroad. The widespread use
of proportionality analysis by Commonwealth and European courts has given
a comparative dimension to arguments in favor of importing it to the American
7
8

9

10
11
12

N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 140 S.
Ct. 1525 (2020) (No. 18-280).
See Joseph Blocher, Response, Rights as Trumps of What?, 132 HARV. L. REV. F. 120, 131–32
(2019) (proposing that the Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n might apply “proportionality
review” as suggested by Greene’s framework, which would align with the approach taken by federal
courts in similar gun rights cases).
Greene, supra note 2, at 58.
Blocher, supra note 9, at 132.
Joel Alicia and John D. Ohlendorf, Against the Tiers of Constitutional Scrutiny, 42 NAT’L AFFS. 72,
73 (2019); see, e.g., id. (calling for the abandonment of the tiers of scrutiny approach on the basis
that they have no actual grounding in the Constitution).
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context. Canadian uses of the doctrine have been especially salient, perhaps
because, like the United States, Canada is a common law jurisdiction with a
partially written constitution, federalism, and an entrenched bill of rights in the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 13 Greene, Jackson, and Breyer all
point longingly to Canadian examples of judges assessing the proportionality
of rights claims as illustrations of how to avoid the pathologies of right-astrumps.
This Article argues that the proportionality approach to rights may not be
the cure many American scholars take it to be. From a dissident Canadian
perspective, American claims about the benefits of proportionality review fail
to adequately account for the ways the rights-as-proportionality framework can
(I) undermine the conceptual connection between rights and justice, thereby
devaluing rights; and (II) distort disagreements about the scope and nature of
rights into disagreements about the value of rights.
These arguments will compare some of the “categorical” American cases
criticized by Greene and Jackson with recent cases of Canadian rights
jurisprudence. These comparisons suggest that proportionality analysis is not
the cure for an ailing democratic rights jurisprudence in a common-law
jurisdiction. Instead, it may contribute to its pathologies. These conceptual
points also entail a critique of Ronald Dworkin’s ideal of rights as individual
interests trumping the interests of the community. This Article suggests that if
we value the transparent connection of rights with justice, we should instead
favor an account of rights as absolute relations of justice between persons
situated in a political community. 14 This absolute view of rights should be
favored because it meets the conceptual desiderata of valuing the connection
between rights and justice in a transparent way. But these conceptual points
do not necessarily explain the institutional effects of proportionality analysis
on democracy.
In order to evaluate the institutional effect that expanding the use of
proportionality might have in the U.S. context, it is necessary to sketch the role
it already plays in American rights jurisprudence. Unfortunately, the very

13

14

The Charter is part of the Constitution Act. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
See generally GRÉGOIRE C.N. WEBBER, THE NEGOTIABLE CONSTITUTION: ON THE LIMITATION
OF RIGHTS 12 (2009) (arguing that the U.S. Constitution can be both the foundation of democracy
and subject to democratic discussion and change, meaning the “the limitation of constitutional rights
will be seen to be an ongoing political process”).
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devaluations and distortions of proportionality reasoning make it difficult to
distinguish cases where it is employed. As such, this Article will use its
distinction between rights as proportionately overridable interests and rights as
absolute relations of justice to provide a brief sketch (III) of how
proportionality plays a mixed role in the various tiers of scrutiny the U.S.
Supreme Court applies to different rights in different circumstances.
This mixed record makes it all the more important to draw on Canadian
comparisons. Canada is particularly apt for comparison because the
institutional effects of the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of proportionality
analysis are more clear cut. By comparing the institutional effects of
proportionality, primarily in the American and Canadian contexts, this Article
will argue (IV) that devaluing and distorting rights can disrupt democracy by
(a) inflating rights, (b) undermining the case for their entrenchment and
judicial review, and (c) fostering an undemocratic form of interrogative
“dialogue” about rights between courts and legislatures.
These institutional conclusions are primarily negative, but this Article is
meant to also hold positive lessons. To that end, this Article outlines two
constructive lessons that can be gleaned from the way proportionality analysis
can devalue and distort rights to the detriment of democracy (V). The first
lesson is that rights should be thought of as morally absolute, even if they are
subject to reasonable disagreements about the scope of their requirements.
Only by thinking of rights as morally absolute can their deep connection to
justice be respected, and morally absolute rights can remain institutionally
open to further specification. Statutes and judicial decisions can each protect
absolute rights in spite of being institutionally open to legislative changes and
doctrinal revisions. This is because such changes and revisions provide a
means of further specifying their requirements in relation to changing
circumstances.
The second lesson is that in order to respect democratic disagreements
about vague constitutional rights, statutory rights should be recognized as
potentially contributing to the construction of the scope of constitutional
rights. This Article does not provide any comprehensive vision of how these
lessons should influence American and Canadian rights jurisprudence. But
this Article does note that these lessons are consistent with the structure of the
Canadian and American constitutions, and that implementing them in cases
such as New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n promises to be a complex but
feasible task.
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Americans sometimes threaten to “move to Canada” in the wake of their
elections; they should think twice about moving Canadian rights jurisprudence
to their own courts. This is an audacious argument, and one that could be
thought better left to an American. That may be, but as H. L. A. Hart once
noted, “there are important aspects of even very large mountains which cannot
be seen by those who live on them but can be caught easily by a single glance
from afar.” 15
I.

DEVALUED RIGHTS

One problem with the American “categorical” approach of subjecting
different types of rights to varying tiers of scrutiny is that it can disconnect rights
from justice. What does this mean? On the one hand, this could mean that
thinking about rights as subject to various tiers of judicial scrutiny disconnects
rights from justice by allowing legislatures to override rights if they have a
legitimate reason connected to their enactment (rational basis scrutiny), or if
the enactment substantially promotes a state interest (intermediate scrutiny),
or if it is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling state interest (strict
scrutiny). 16 On the other hand, it could be that this approach disconnects rights
from justice by artificially narrowing what judges are free to consider and
balance as the interests related to a rights dispute. American proponents of
proportionality analysis have generally taken the latter view regarding the
devaluation of rights. In this Part, I will first explain this claim, and then argue
that it is conceptually mistaken.
There are a number of recent arguments claiming to show how the
“categorical” American approach to rights devalues the connection between
rights and justice. Professor Greene castigates the ideal of rights-as-trumps for
disassociating rights from “notions of substantive justice.” 17 Greene’s account
of how the categorical American approach to rights devalues rights focuses on
the way it shears the connection between justice and the many interests at stake
in rights questions. In a similar vein, Professor Jackson draws on Mark
Tushnet’s scholarship to argue that the U.S. Supreme Court’s focus on “rules”

15

16
17

H. L. A. HART, Essay 4 American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the
Noble Dream, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123, 123 (1983).
YOWELL, supra note 1, at 21.
Greene, supra note 2, at 70.
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categorizing constitutional rights has distracted it from “the purposes of the
constitutional provision the rule is intended to implement” and thus turned its
attention away from “constitutional justice[.]” 18 Jackson shares Greene’s
concern with the way categorical rights create the need for rights doctrine to
consider “a fuller range of the factors that people in ordinary life consider
reasonable” to “help re-establish the law’s connection to justice.” 19 But she
also emphasizes that the American categorical approach to rights can devalue
rights where it develops arbitrary exceptions to rules defining the scope of
rights. 20 This Part will critique Greene and Jackson’s arguments to argue that
proportionality analysis disconnects rights and justice by allowing rights to be
overridden. The first conceptual point is that both rights-as-trumps and rightsas-proportionality can devalue rights by denying just rights claims. The second
conceptual point is that rights-as-proportionality uniquely devalues rights by
requiring judges to assess whether rights can be justifiably overridden. By
allowing rights to be overridden, proportionality analysis intrinsically devalues
the conceptual connection between rights and justice.
On Greene’s telling, conceiving of constitutional rights as absolute legal
protections against unjust state actions demeans the consideration of other
collective interests and their connection to just rights. For Greene, this is true
of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of right-as-trumps, but also where American
judges follow this theory by “categorizing” some rights as absolute trumps in
relation to specific kinds of laws and circumstances, while leaving others less
protected or unrecognized as rights. 21 In contrast, he thinks that Canadian
judges assessing the justification of rights “infringements” use this technique to
avoid arbitrarily excluding communal interests that bear on rights questions. 22
18

19
20
21

22

Jackson, supra note 5, 3149–51. Mark Tushet argues that Justice Breyer's dissent in Heller should
"be understood as about the application of legal judgment to complex settings." Id. at 3149 (citing
Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Critique of Judgment, SUP. CT. REV. 61, 71, 76–84 (2008)). In
addition, Tushet has argued that the Supreme Court's First Amendment decisions in certain cases
“represent a form of 'judicial pathology,' . . . [which] is connected to the 'rule-ification' of the area and
a related 'fear' of making obvious judgment calls on issues of degree.” Id. (citing Mark Tushnet, The
First Amendment and Political Risk, 4 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 103, 105–06 (2012)).
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3148.
Id. at 3136-3142.
See Greene, supra note 2, at 68–69 (discussing the weakness in Dworkin’s analysis of different
types of racial classifications and arguing that Dworkin’s rights-as-trumps does not obligate the
courts to treat all interests in the same way).
See id. at 38–40 (giving an example of the Canadian Supreme Court balancing the interests of the
public against the infringement of the rights of a few).
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What is Dworkin’s theory of rights-as-trumps? Dworkin’s mature theory
of rights holds that rights protect the specific interests of individuals that
“trump” the pursuit of the general welfare of the political community. 23 What
kind of interests protect rights-as-trumps? Only individual interests threatened
by prejudices and preferences inimical to citizens’ “equal concern and respect”
are protected by rights-as-trumps. 24 The interests normally protected by rights
can be sacrificed for the common good only where they are justified by reasons
not mired in anti-egalitarian prejudice, such as “when necessary to protect the
rights of others, or to prevent a catastrophe, or even to obtain a clear and major
public benefit[.]” 25
Greene’s critique of Dworkin’s argument is itself a way of critiquing the
U.S. Supreme Court’s approach to fundamental constitutional rights. Greene
argues that just as Dworkin’s ideal of rights blinds Dworkin to the connection
between certain communal interests and just rights, so too does American
courts’ tendency to categorize rights according to the kind of prejudice they
protect against prevents judges from properly considering the true variety of
rights at stake in cases. For example, Greene thinks Dworkin’s ideal of rightsas-trumps leads to the devaluation of just rights interests not threatened by
majority preferences or prejudices, such as the interests of whites in
affirmative-actions cases. 26
Greene finds evidence for his claim in Dworkin’s analysis of DeFunis v.
Odegaard. 27 In this case the plaintiff Marco DeFunis argued that affirmative
action policies resulted in reverse racial discrimination against his admission
to the University of Washington Law School in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. 28 Dworkin thought that the plaintiff had no right against the
discrimination of law schools because it was motivated by principled
arguments about justice rather than prejudice. 29 For Greene, the plaintiff’s

23

24
25
26
27
28
29

See RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 329 (2011) (explaining that increased safety, as
an example of general welfare, is “trumped” by the right to give unpopular speeches in public streets,
as well as the right of suspected terrorists to not be locked up indefinitely without judicial review of
any charges against them).
Id. at 330.
RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 191 (1977).
Greene, supra note 2, at 67–70.
416 U.S. 312 (1974).
Id. at 314.
DWORKIN, supra note 25, at 237–39.
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interest does not override the affirmative action program, but does constitute
a legitimate rights interest that requires special consideration rather than brute
dismissal. 30 While DeFunis was ultimately dismissed for mootness, Greene
thinks the influence of Dworkin’s frame of rights-as-trumps turns
constitutional litigation into a zero-sum game that tells the losers, “they have
no rights the law is bound to respect.” 31 He claims that American courts
regularly follow Dworkin in devaluing the rights interests of the losing side with
their strict scrutiny analysis of the government’s “compelling interest” or even
scrutiny of the “rational basis” for laws abridging rights. 32
While Dworkin’s work is not responsible for the dominance of rights-astrumps in U.S. law, it philosophically epitomizes the difficulties with this
framework. Greene surveys how the “categorical” framework of American
rights adjudication disconnects rights from justice by discounting many of the
rights interests at stake in controversial cases such as Employment Division v.
Smith, 33 Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 34
District of Columbia v. Heller, 35 and Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission. 36 Either a baker has a right to refuse to bake a gay wedding cake
as a matter of free speech that the government has no compelling interest in
regulating, or he has no right to express his religious views in ways that
discriminate against gay couples. 37 Either the right to bear arms extends to the
possession of handguns by mentally sane, individual non-felons outside of
schools and government buildings in the District of Columbia, or these
individuals have no such rights. 38 And so on. The possibility that interests

30

31
32

33
34
35
36
37

38

See Greene, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that the theory of rights-as-trumps does not obligate courts to
treat interests in the same way as trumps; nonetheless, race-based affirmative action programs must
be implemented more carefully than programs that categorize others on different grounds).
Id. at 79.
See Greene, supra note 2, at 56 (concluding that the categorical approach informs American
constitutional cases); see also Richard H. Fallon Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267,
1274, 1284–85 (2007) (providing a helpful survey of the origins of the tiers of scrutiny).
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018).
554 U.S. 570 (2008).
558 U.S. 310 (2010).
See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723 (considering the proper reconciliation of at least two
principles: the discrimination against gay persons and the right to exercise the freedom of speech and
religion).
See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (considering whether the District of Columbia’s prohibition on the
possession of handguns in the home violated the Second Amendment).
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related to different just rights might conflict in these cases is apparently
ignored. Rather, these cases are discussed as evidence of an approach that
“induces our identification of rights to track the categories judges are able to
access, articulate, and delimit rather than the moral, political, or even
constitutional justice the rights mean to promote.” 39
This “categorical” approach is contrasted unfavorably with the
“proportionality” approach practiced by the Canadian Supreme Court in its
analysis of Charter rights. While Greene is admirably willing to discuss the
shortcomings of proportionality analysis, he fails to adequately explain the way
it devalues the substantive justice of the variety of rights interests it interrogates.
The proportionality approach to rights devalues rights by reducing them to
defeasible interests. If Marco DeFunis had an interest grounding a right
against unequal racial treatment by the law that could be balanced and
overridden for the greater good, then it’s hard to see why this would better
recognize the connection between that right and justice than Dworkin’s
approach. His rights-claim would be merely prima facie. Both rights-astrumps and rights-as-proportionality appear to override DeFunis’ claim to a
just right. In truth, Dworkin’s account of rights-as-trumps may be much closer
to the proportionality approach than Greene realizes. This is because on
Dworkin’s view, as Paul Yowell has adeptly shown, rights-as-trumps allow for
balancing sufficiently important interests and thereby conceive of rights-asproportionate trumps. 40 This raises the possibility that when Dworkin’s ideal
of rights-as-trumps and other American cases devalue rights it is often because
they share in the proportionality approach to treating rights as defeasible
interests, albeit in a narrower fashion.
It is important not to get too bogged down in philosophy. Examples can
help show how the rights-as-trumps or right-as-proportionality frameworks can
devalue rights: Consider the similar way rights to the free exercise of religion
are potentially devalued in the U.S. Supreme Court case of Employment
Division v. Smith and the Canadian case of Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of
Wilson Colony. 41 In Smith, two Oregonian members of the Native American

39
40
41

Greene, supra note 2, at 32–33.
YOWELL, supra note 1, at 40–55.
See Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 872 (1990) (considering whether the Free Exercise Clause
allows Oregon to criminalize peyote, even when it is consumed for religious reasons); Alberta v.
Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.) (upholding a Canadian law that

January 2021]

THROUGH CANADIAN EYES

137

Church were fired from their jobs with a private company because they
ingested peyote for sacramental purposes. 42 They were then subsequently
denied unemployment compensation because they had been fired for
ingesting a substance prohibited by an Oregon statute. 43 The plaintiffs argued
that this discriminated against their First Amendment right to freely exercise
their Native American religion. 44 The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the
claim by interpreting the right to free exercise to not protect “otherwise
prohibitable conduct” that is “accompanied by religious convictions” from
“government regulation.” 45 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion held that
evaluating the impact of every regulation interfering with religious convictions
in relation to the state’s “compelling interest” for doing so would be “courting
anarchy.” 46
Greene thinks of Smith as a classic case of rights-as-trumps, where the
messy job of balancing all of the rights interests at stake in free exercise claims
is cut off with a rule restricting the category of cases where this right can be
asserted. 47 This devalues the rights interest of the two Oregonians seeking to
freely exercise their religion by lumping it in with all manner of rights claims
that would appear to require unreasonable exemption from civic obligations.
But is the categorization of the plaintiffs’ interest as falling outside of the
protection of the Free Exercise Clause really the reason why the Court
devalues their right?
Would the plaintiffs’ rights be any more “valued” if the Court had followed
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence by including their religious interest within the
protected scope of the Free Exercise Clause, but then concluding that this
interest was outweighed by the government’s interest in “preventing the
physical harm caused by the use of a Schedule I controlled substance[?]” 48 If
the Oregonians’ rights claim has just value, as O’Connor reasons that it does,
then the way she devalues the rights-claim is not by placing it outside the

42
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45
46
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requires Members of Hutterian Brethren, against their religious beliefs, to have their photograph
taken in order to hold an Alberta driver’s license).
Smith, 494 U.S. at 874.

Id.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 882.
Id. at 888.
Greene, supra note 2, at 44–45.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 905 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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category of the protected right. Rather, she devalues the rights-claim by placing
it within the scope of the right, while treating the claim as a mere interest that
can be overridden by interests lying outside of the scope of constitutional
rights. The counter-factual suggests that the real reason that the Court
devalued the plaintiffs’ rights in Smith is that by setting their interest outside of
the category of rights protection, the justices allowed a plausible rights-claim to
be violated as one policy interest among others in the maelstrom of the
“political process.” 49
The Canadian case of Hutterian Bretheren showcases how the
proportionality approach can devalue rights in a similar, albeit perhaps more
explicit, fashion. The case involved Albertan Hutterites who objected to
having their photographs appear on their driver’s licenses and sought
accommodation as a matter of their right to freedom of religion under section
2(a) of the Charter. 50 Prior to a regulatory change, there was a photographic
exemption for religious objectors. 51 The Canadian Supreme Court’s majority
decision categorized the new regulation as an “infringement” of religious
practice protected by 2(a) of the Charter, but used the proportionality test
developed in the landmark case of R. v. Oakes to assess the justification for
the “limitation” of this right. 52 The majority of the court held that the legitimate
and suitable government aim of having a photo database lacking exceptions
“minimally impair[ed]” the right, and that Alberta’s interest in the security of
its licensing system outweighed any case-by-case harm to the religious freedom
of individuals. 53 The decision was highly questionable as a proper application
of the “minimal impairment” branch of the proportionality test, as the
majority failed to establish why the photographs of 250 Hutterites were
necessary to maintain a secure licensing system in a province with 700,000
unlicensed citizens. 54 But it also devalued the Hutterites’ right to religious
freedom by treating it as a near inconsequential policy interest.
This devaluation was not the result of the Canadian court’s categorization
of the scope of the right, but rather a consequence of treating the right as an

49

Id. at 890.
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Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567, para. 2 (Can).
Id. at para. 1.
Id. at paras. 35–108.
Id. at para. 62.
Id. at paras. 141, 143, 158 (Abella, J., dissenting).
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interest worth less than the province’s interest in discouraging license fraud.
The Canadian court categorized the regulation as an “infringement” that
would “impose some financial cost on the community and depart from their
tradition of being self-sufficient in terms of transport” in proportionality with
the benefits of maintaining an “effective driver’s license scheme that minimizes
the risk of fraud to citizens as a whole.” 55 The Hutterites interest in religious
freedom was outweighed by the province’s proclaimed interest in keeping
down license fraud.
Perhaps in anticipation of this critique, Professor Jackson has emphasized
that there are reasons to doubt the “protective power” of the categorical
approach to rights as it compares with Canadian proportionality reasoning. 56
Her point is not simply that the categorical approach to rights can fail to value
rights, as on Greene’s critical view of Smith, but that the categorical stance
invites devaluation when it makes exceptions to rules defining the scope of
rights. 57 She takes this lesson from the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent creation
of exceptions to its free speech categories, particularly in Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project. 58 Humanitarian Law Project involved U.S.-based
non-governmental organizations seeking to provide non-violent training in
international law to certain terrorist groups, like the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(or PKK) in Turkey, challenging a criminal statute prohibiting material
support to groups designated as terrorist organizations. 59 The statute was
challenged as a content-based regulation as it applied to the kind of speech
engaged in by the plaintiffs, but the Court nonetheless upheld the law due to
the government’s compelling interest in combatting terrorism. 60
Jackson thinks that Humanitarian Law Project made an implicit exception
to the Court’s Brandenburg v. Ohio strict scrutiny standard prohibiting the
content-based suppression of speech inciting violence except when such
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Id. at paras. 99, 101.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137.
Id. at 3139–41.
Id.; see also Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010).
Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. at 10.
Id. at 39–40; see also Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137 (“Concluding that the statute involved a contentbased regulation of speech [in Humanitarian Law Project], the Court nonetheless upheld the statute
in light of the government’s interest in combatting terrorism.”).
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speech incites imminent action and lawlessness. 61
She notes that
Humanitarian Law Project does not mention Brandenburg’s precedent, and
reads the majority opinion as engaged in a less-stringent analysis of whether
the statute was narrowly tailored to the purpose of combatting terrorism in
ways that did not unnecessarily affect protected speech. 62 Humanitarian Law
Project is criticized for its alleged failure to clearly address whether national
security statutes need to be less narrowly tailored to their purpose when they
implicate free speech rights. 63 This failure to explicitly address the balancing
at work in developing an exception to Brandenburg’s rule defining the scope
of speech rights against content-based suppression shows how the categorical
approach can devalue rights by allowing them to be overridden, while doing
so in a way that is less accountable. 64 Jackson’s claim appears to be that while
both the categorical treatment of rights-as-trumps and proportionality analysis
can devalue rights by allowing them to be overridden, proportionality analysis
allows courts to better protect rights by making the balancing of policy interests
and rights more explicit.
But notice that the devaluation of rights is built into the proportionality
approach, whereas it is merely incidental to more categorical approaches that
treat legal rights as absolute relations of justice. This is the second conceptual
point concerning how rights-as-proportionality compares to rights-as-trumps:
rights-as-proportionality intrinsically devalues rights.
Consider how the two conceptual approaches to rights compare in
Humanitarian Law Project. It may be that the Court’s approach to specifying
its exception to Brandenburg in Humanitarian Law Project could have been
clearer and more consistent, but it does not follow that this type of exception
must involve the justification of suppressing speech rights. Indeed, the
majority opinion’s limitation of the protection afforded to speech coordinated
with terrorist groups 65 could be interpreted as specifying the rule in
61
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63

Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137. In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969), the Court struck
down a state statute on the grounds that it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendment. In other
words, the Court held that “speech believed to incite violence could be banned only when the
speech’s character was an incitement to imminent action and likely to cause imminent lawlessness.”
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3137.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3139.
Id. at 3140.
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Id.
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Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561 U.S. 1, 26 (2010) (“[T]he [relevant] statute is carefully drawn
to cover only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign
groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.” (footnote omitted)).
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Brandenburg in relationship to the unique uncertainty of when terrorist
violence is imminent. On this reading, Humanitarian Law Project does not
quietly devalue rights, but specifies their scope in relation to specific
circumstances. It develops a new rule delimiting the scope of freedom of
speech. Of course, it also seems plausible that this specification could devalue
speech rights because it is mistaken to think of speech that may support
terrorist violence as unprotected; however, that is quite different from
devaluing rights by doctrinally inviting courts to assess the proportionality of
infringing the right to speech that supports organizations capable of imminent
violence. The former method can devalue rights by failing to properly specify
rights in relation to history, precedent, and perhaps even some normative
judgments about the scope of rights in particular circumstances, but the latter
openly requires courts to consider whether rights are more or less important
in certain cases.
This contrast is also evident in Smith and Hutterian Brethren. If Smith
had categorized the Oregonian plaintiffs’ interest in using peyote within the
scope of the right to free exercise of religion and then eschewed balancing, the
right would not be devalued. Treating rights as just trumps can devalue rights
where judgments about the scope of rights are mistaken, but not when it
properly categorizes rights. Categorization can take on many different
techniques of adjudication, but it does not itself devalue rights. By contrast,
even if Hutterian Brethren had been decided in favor of the Hutterites, the
requisite balancing of this right as an interest at the “minimal impairment” and
strict “proportionality” stages of the Oakes analysis raises the possibility that
this right can be overridden at the discretion of judges. This possibility
devalues the right. The Hutterites do not have much when they have a right
to religious freedom. They need a right and a judge who values that right.
Of course, there are responses to this line of critique of proportionality
analysis. Both Greene and Jackson admit that there are problems with
proportionality analysis and limits to the feasibility of its implementation in the
U.S. context. Nevertheless, both insist that rights are more valued in the
Canadian world of proportionality analysis than the American realm of rightsas-trumps.
Greene’s main counter-argument is that while in some cases rights will be
devalued by treating them as overridable interests rather than absolute
relations of justice, the greater risk is that judges will make mistakes about the
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scope of rights as absolute relations of justice. 66 The reason that the risk of
judges making mistakes about categorical rights is the greater threat is that the
moral value of rights is subject to reasonable disagreement and judges are not
equipped to resolve such disputes using “philosophical analysis or moral
inspection.” 67 This counter-argument fails because, as Professor Grégoire
Webber has argued, it is perfectly consistent to think of rights as absolute
relations of justice while also appreciating the existence of widespread
reasonable disagreement about the absolute duties and obligations that flow
from just rights. 68 It is also reasonable to think these thoughts and conclude,
as Webber does, that the logic of entrenching rights as supreme constitutional
law requires judges to invalidate statutes that clearly violate rights, but defer to
those subject to reasonable disagreement. 69
It is possible to agree with Greene that judges do indeed risk a great deal
when they strike down enactments purporting to settle reasonable
disagreements about rights, yet also think that judges conceptually devalue
rights by treating them as overridable interests. As Webber notes, it is
necessary to distinguish conceptual arguments about whether rights can be
overridden from arguments about which institutions will do the best job of
overriding them or ensuring that they are not overridden. 70 As such, Greene’s
institutional argument doesn’t answer the charge that rights are conceptually
devalued by reducing them to overridable interests—whether such reduction is
the outcome of miscategorizing or balancing.
Jackson’s main counter-argument is to point out how proportionality
analysis is compatible with recognizing “‘core’ aspects of rights that are viewed
as entirely non-abrogable and not subject to limitation by arguments from
proportionality.” 71 She points to examples of German and Israeli courts that
make extensive use of proportionality analysis, but have also categorically
66
67
68

69
70

71

Greene, supra note 2, at 87–89.
Id. at 88.
See generally WEBBER, supra note 14, at 147–212 (arguing that democratic legitimacy requires
treating the legislature as the central forum for the specification of rights subject to reasonable
disagreement about the absolute but negotiable scope of their duties and obligations of justice).
Id. at 203–212.
See Grégoire Webber, Proportionality and Absolute Rights, in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW
FRONTIERS, NEW CHALLENGES 75, 94 (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2017) (“[W]hen it
is concluded that legislation justifiably limits a right, legislation is to be understood as justifiably
defining an underdefined right.”).
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3158 (footnote omitted).
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struck down laws as wholly inconsistent with the value of rights to dignity and
personal liberty. 72 Furthermore, she notes that the ability of courts using
proportionality analysis to exclude impermissible reasons governments offer
for violating rights, as this helps shore up the judicial capacity to protect rights.
This counter-argument is unconvincing because it appears to point to
examples of courts eschewing proportionality analysis in favor of an absolute
conception of rights. It treats examples of absolute rights as evidence that
proportionality reasoning can protect the value of rights. What these examples
show is that in rare cases courts have abandoned proportionality reasoning to
protect just rights, which suggests that proportionality may not sufficiently
protect the value of rights. The result is that Jackson’s counter-argument fails
to grapple with the main conceptual point that proportionality intrinsically
devalues rights by treating them as defeasible interests. Neither is it satisfactory
to point to the ability of courts to exclude certain kinds of reasons for violating
rights as a means of bolstering the ability of proportionality analysis. Excluding
reasons for violating rights is in some cases simply another way of defining the
absolute limits on rights. In cases where a reason for violating a right is
excluded from reasoning about what should be done, the right’s demands are
absolute in relation to that reason. This protects rights by specifying their
requirements.
Of course, it is a related but separate conceptual question whether
proportionality analysis provides a more transparent mode of reasoning about
the nature of rights. Transparency is the second virtue of rights-asproportionality, according to its proponents. 73 In some cases, such as when we
compare the way rights may have been devalued in Smith against the way they
were devalued in Hutterian Brethren, it seems plausible to claim that having
courts openly balancing the interests that justify overriding rights is more
transparent than arbitrarily categorizing certain interests outside of rights’
protection. Even if the approach in Hutterian Brethren intrinsically devalues
rights, it may nevertheless do so more transparently than the categorical
approach used in Smith. The following Part will evaluate this claim.
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Id.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142.
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II. DISTORTED RIGHTS
How does the American framework of rights-as-trumps compare with the
Canadian framework of rights-as-proportionality when it comes to
transparently tracking the full complexity of reasonable disagreements about
rights issues? Those who champion importing proportionality analysis into
U.S. rights jurisprudence often claim that the Canadian approach promises to
be more transparent. Greene claims that rights-as-proportionality more
transparently tracks the various interests at stake in rights disagreements, while
rights-as-trumps obscures these interests and encourages judges to distort the
meaning of rights to fit their judgments about how such interests relate to
particular circumstances. 74 For Jackson, the Canadian framework of rights-asproportionality promises a more “structured and transparent mode of reasongiving” 75 that can “provide a bridge between decision making in courts and
decision making by the people, legislatures, and public officials.” 76 To an
extent, I agree with Greene and Jackson that American rights jurisprudence
can inflate and confuse rights, but it tends to do so in an especially distorting
fashion when it follows the framework of rights-as-proportionate-trumps.
Indeed, the distortions of rights-as-trumps Greene and Jackson decry in cases
such as Citizens United and Humanitarian Law Project are often traceable to
proportionality oriented reasoning about rights as interests.
In order to explain how rights-as-proportionality conceptually distorts
moral disagreements about rights, it will be useful to show how the apparent
distortions of rights-as-trumps can sometimes be traced to the concept of rights
employed in proportionality judgments. For Greene and Jackson, the
tendency of U.S. courts to categorize rights in relation to different types of
issues, agents, and circumstances distorts the empirical particularity and moral
value judgments at stake in rights disagreements in favor of universal
interpretive legal rules. By contrast, they take the Canadian proportionality
approach to promote more transparency and attention to the particular value
judgments in rights adjudication.
74

75
76

See Greene, supra note 2, at 70–77 (relying on Walker v. Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135
S. Ct. 2239 (2015) to show that modern Supreme Court justices, who are rights-as-trumps jurists, will
merely assert that a key right that the federal government is supposed to protect has been violated by
the state, rather than embracing the rights-as-proportionality analysis).
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142.
Id. at 3144.
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For example, Greene contrasts the Canadian Supreme Court’s decision
about how restrictions on third-party campaign spending relate to the right to
freedom of expression in Harper v. Canada 77 to the U.S. Supreme Court’s
approach to this question in Citizens United v. FEC. 78 Jackson focuses less on
direct comparisons between American and Canadian cases, and argues that
the “sequencing and defined order” of Canadian proportionality “enables the
Canadian justices’ disagreements to focus on matters that are understandable
by the parties as substantively relevant to the contested issue; such opinions
also make accessible to readers the nature of the justices’ disagreement, and
the divergent evaluations they may give to the same factors.” 79
This Part will argue that Greene’s comparison of Harper and Citizens
United fails to properly track how proportionality judgments distort the rights
at stake in both cases. In turn, the distortions of Harper and Citizens United
provide evidence that the kind of proportionality reasoning Jackson locates in
American cases such as Humanitarian Law Project would not be rendered any
less conceptually distortive by restructuring rights analysis along Canadian
lines.
Let’s first examine Greene’s discussion of Harper and Citizens United.
Greene applauds the open judicial display of value laden policy judgments
considering various interests in Harper. In Harper, Stephen Harper, then
president of the National Citizens Coalition lobby group and future Prime
Minister of Canada, challenged provisions of the Canada Elections Act,
including section 350’s restriction on third-party spending during a federal
election to at the time of the ruling a maximum of $150,000 nationally and
$3,000 in a given riding. 80 He claimed that these restrictions violated the
Charter right to freedom of expression (section 2(b)) and the right to vote
(section 3), but the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court held that they
“enhance” the right to vote and justifiably infringe freedom of expression. 81
The law’s restrictions on freedom of expression were found to serve the
important interests of “promoting equality in political discourse” and ensuring
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Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (Can.).
Greene, supra note 2, at 40.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142 (footnote omitted).
Harper, 1 S.C.R. at para. 3 (citing Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 2000, c. 9, s. 350).
Id. at paras. 66, 67, 146.
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the “integrity” of campaign financing. 82 The restrictions were rationally
connected to achieving these goals, and minimally impaired political
expression by limiting their restriction to “the commencement of the election
period” and “preclud[ing] the voices of the wealthy from dominating the
political discourse[.]” 83 The values of equal political discourse and enhanced
electoral fairness and accessibility were proportionate to the harm of
preventing “unlimited political expression.” 84
Greene contrasts Harper with the U.S. Supreme Court’s subterfuge of
categorizing the third-party spending limits challenged in Citizens United as
identity-based restrictions on free speech. Citizens United held that the First
Amendment’s right to freedom of speech protects against the suppression of
“political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate identity.” 85 The case
involved a non-profit corporation funded in part by for-profit corporations that
produced and distributed a documentary film criticizing then-Senator Hillary
Clinton while she was a candidate for President of the United States. 86 The
Court held that the impugned campaign finance law restricting the political
expenditures of corporations and unions (the Federal Bipartisan Campaign
Reform Act) discriminated against political speech on the basis of corporate
identity. 87
The government’s justifications for these restrictions—
“antidistortion,” 88 “anticorruption,” 89 and “shareholder protection” 90— failed to
demonstrate a compelling interest for the law under the strict scrutiny
demanded by speaker-based restrictions.
The contrast Greene seeks to draw between Harper and Citizens United
is that Harper transparently balanced the particular interests at stake in third-
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Id. at para.104.
Id. at paras. 112, 118.
Id. at para. 121.
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010).
Id. at 319–20.
See id. at 341 (holding that “in the context of political speech,” the Government may not impose
restrictions on disfavored speakers).
See id. at 349–56 (articulating the Government’s view that it can regulate a corporation’s speech when
it would receive an unfair advantage).
See id. at 356 (articulating the Government’s view that it can ban corporate political speech because
it prevents the appearance of corruption).
See id. at 361 (articulating the Government’s position that “corporate independent expenditures can
be limited because of its interest in protecting dissenting shareholders from being compelled to fund
corporate speech”).
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party campaign spending, while Citizens United short-circuited this analysis by
focusing “on the threshold question of whether the legal regime triggered strict
scrutiny[.]” 91 But these cases provide less of a contrast than a mutual exhibition
of the distortions of proportionality analysis.
Consider Citizens United. Greene is correct to claim that the Court’s
approach to rights in Citizens United distorts the real question at stake in the
case. As a matter of reasonable moral disagreement, American politicians and
judges can be roughly divided between those who favor rights protections for
both individual political expenditures and campaign contributions, and those
who think both expenditures and contributions should be regulated. 92 This
moral policy disagreement is constitutionalized, because those who favor
protections for expenditures and contributions argue that these rights can be
found in the First Amendment’s free speech and press clauses. Those who
oppose these protections object to this legal argument. The case of Buckley
v. Valeo (which oriented the debate around these distinctions) upheld
restrictions on contributions as a means of preventing corruption, while
striking down certain limits on expenditures as “direct restraint[s]” on speech. 93
Citizens United affirms the constitutionality of limits on campaign finance
but expands the protection for expenditures as a matter of a new interest in
freedom from the suppression of speech based on the identity of the speaker.
This is why the real question distorted by Citizens United is not “whether the
speech being regulated is of relatively low or high value[.]” 94 That would
presuppose that expenditures count as constitutionally protected political
speech. As Michael McConnell has argued, the real question at stake in
Citizens United was “whether a group outside the news industry is
constitutionally entitled to disseminate to the public through mass
communications media a commentary about a candidate for public office
within a certain number of days before an election.” 95
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Greene, supra note 2, at 42.
See Michael W. McConnell, Reconsidering Citizens United as a Press Clause Case, 123 YALE L.J.
412, 456 (2013) (“The distinction between contributions and expenditures survives in the Supreme
Court only because the two sides are at odds about how to resolve it.”).
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21, 45 (1976).
Greene, supra note 2, at 40.
McConnell, supra note 92, at 422.
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Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the majority actually starts off by appearing
to inquire into the scope of the right at stake in the case, but it confusingly
defines the right by treating it as an interest to be balanced. The protection
for speaker-based speech restrictions is extended by balancing the
government’s anti-distortion interest against the interest in free political
expression. 96 Freedom from speaker-based speech suppression is defined as
part of the right to free political expression, because the restriction of certain
viewpoints can take the form of limiting what kinds of speakers can engage in
political speech. 97 The government discriminates against the identity of the
speaker when it restricts the political speech of wealthy individuals,
corporations, unions, and non-profits. 98 Although media companies are
exempted from the impugned restrictions, hypothetical limits on the
expenditures of a wealthy media company would involve suppressing their
political speech on the basis of their identity. 99 This outcome is not only at
odds with precedent, but the original meaning of the First Amendment would
not “permit the suppression of political speech by media corporations.” 100 The
further inference is that freedom from speaker based restrictions constitute
part of citizens’ interest in free political expression. The inference is the key
to how the right is hazily defined by balancing the value of the government’s
interest in preventing distortion against a general interest in freedom from
identity-based restrictions. The Court concludes that the latter must prevail
because if it did not it would jeopardize the higher value of freedom of speech.
The majority opinion then moves on to balance the value of freedom from
identity-based restrictions on political speech with the government’s interests
in preventing “quid pro quo corruption.” 101 The Court dismisses the
government’s aim in preventing corruption as “[t]he anticorruption interest is
96
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See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 349 (2010) (noting the government’s interest in antidistortion and the competing First Amendment interest in preventing the government from fining or
jailing a group of citizens merely because of their political speech).
See id. at 350 (“The rule that political speech cannot be limited based on a speaker’s wealth is a
necessary consequence of the premise that the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression
of political speech based on the speaker’s identity.”).
See id. at 350–52 (noting that the Government cannot limit individuals’ or corporations’ political
speech on account of their wealth).
See id. at 352 (arguing that the First Amendment prevents corporations’ political speech from being
limited because they are classified as “wealthy”).
Id. at 353.
Id. at 359.
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not sufficient to displace the speech here in question.” 102 It then evaluates the
governmental interest “in protecting dissenting shareholders from being
compelled to fund corporate political speech.” 103 This interest is balanced
against freedom of speech, but found to be an unacceptable reason that would,
like countering distortion, “allow the Government to ban the political speech
even of media corporations.” 104
My reading of Citizens United indicates how balancing rights as interests
involves distorting moral judgments that distract courts from transparently
specifying the legal scope and content of rights. The way the Court treats the
freedom from speaker-based restrictions on political expenditures as part of
the protected interest in political speech allows its analysis to rely on the moral
importance of freedom of speech. The Court does not look to how the
original meaning, precedent, or tradition concerning the Free Speech and
Press Clauses define the right at stake. It examines the reasons and means by
which the interest in freedom from identity-based speech restrictions can be
justifiably violated. It finds that restrictions on the speech of certain speakers
are justified due to “an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform
their functions[,]” 105 but few others match the moral importance of free
political speech.
But does allowing speaker-based restrictions on expenditures license the
restraint of political viewpoints? Against what standard do the justices find that
the interest in freedom of expression is justifiably infringed by laws
implementing government functions?
These questions arise because the argument assumes rather than proves
that what is at stake in the case is the right to be free from speaker-based speech
suppression. Those who reasonably question extending the scope of the right
to freedom of speech to protect against most speaker-based regulations are
caricatured as endorsing the state regulation of media expenditures due to
their failure to sufficiently value citizens’ interest in speaking freely. This newly
minted right exposes long accepted restrictions on corporate and union
campaign contributions as unjustifiable speaker-based restrictions, 106
mischaracterizes many good faith proponents of regulating independent
102
103
104
105
106

Id. at 357.
Id. at 361.
Id. (citation omitted).
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political expenditures as agitators for media regulation, and fails to account for
the potentially distinctive freedoms protected by the freedom of speech and
the press. These are distortions of the disagreement between those who favor
protections for third-party expenditures and those who wish to regulate such
spending. But Greene is mistaken to attribute such distortions to rights-astrumps. They are the fruit of conceiving of the right against speaker-based
speech suppression as an interest that cannot be proportionately trumped by
laws advancing most other interests. They flow from the very kind of value
judgment Greene celebrates in Harper.
This understanding of Citizens United contrasts with Harper’s outcome
but largely mirrors its method. Whereas Citizens United finds that speakerbased expenditure restrictions violate citizens’ interest in freedom of speech,
in Harper, the Crown “concedes” that its restrictions on individual third-party
campaign spending “infringes” the Charter’s right to freedom of expression. 107
Citizens’ interest in freedom of expression is subsequently balanced against
the “pressing and substantial” interests of “equality in the political discourse”
among others. 108 Restricting third-party expenditures is “rationally connected”
to promoting egalitarian political discourse because unequal resources for
purchasing advertising will enable the unequal influence of some “to dominate
the electoral discourse[.]” 109 The restrictions “minimally impair” freedom of
expression because advertising is unlimited before an election period, there
are “few obstacles” to citizens creating, joining, and contributing to parties, and
advertisement unrelated to “a candidate or political party” is unlimited. 110 The
restrictions are “proportionate” because their “salutary effects[,]” such as
promoting the “political expression of those who are less affluent or less
capable of obtaining access to significant financial resources” trump the
“deleterious effect” of not allowing third parties “unlimited political
expression.” 111 The interest in equal political expression trumps the interest in
free expression.
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Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 372; Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, para.
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Id. at paras. 112–14.
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Harper may be more explicit in its use of proportionality and arrive at an
outcome more amenable to Greene’s judgment, but it distorts rights in the
same fashion as Citizens United. Justice Bastarache’s majority opinion in
Harper concludes that citizens’ interest in freedom of expression is
proportionately infringed by third party expenditures to promote equal
political expression. 112 Just as Citizens United assumes the rights interest it
should prove, Harper assumes that third-party spending restrictions infringe
citizens’ interest in freedom of expression even as its proportionality analysis
appears to turn on the conclusion that promoting equality of “political
expression” protects this interest. 113 This oddly implies that third-party
spending is protected by freedom of expression, but nevertheless should be
infringed to serve citizens’ interest in equal political expression. The Canadian
Supreme Court thereby distorts the question of whether freedom of
expression protects third-party expenditures by assuming that it does, but then
reasoning that other interests related to political expression justify acting
against this right.
Citizens United and Harper are just two cases concerning a particular
rights question, but they provide a sense of how the rights-as-proportionality
framework can distort disagreements about the scope of rights into confused
disagreements about the value of rights.
Cases like Harper and Citizens United also suggest that Jackson is
mistaken to place hope in fixing the kinds of distortion she finds in
Humanitarian Law Project by restructuring American rights jurisprudence to
more closely resemble the Canadian approach.
Although Jackson has insightfully explored the way proportionality has
played a role in doctrines concerning the Eighth Amendment and Due
Process Clause, 114 she joins Greene in advocating for the expansion of this role
to achieve more transparent protections for rights. I have argued that Citizens
United can be read as collapsing the categorical approach into a
proportionality judgment. This resembles Jackson’s characterization of
Humanitarian Law Project as a demonstration of how proportionality
judgments can be disguised by the categorical approach. The difference is that

112
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Id. at para. 146.
Id. at para. 120.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3104–05.
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Jackson goes one step further and argues that Humanitarian Law Project
shows the inevitability of using proportionality judgments to make exceptions
to categorical rules for defining rights. 115
As mentioned above, she takes this inevitability to show that critics of
proportionality underestimate the way the categorical approach can devalue
rights by overriding them. She also thinks the inevitability of proportionality
judgments means that rights will be better protected by making its exercise
more explicit and subject to doctrinal rules. 116 Proportionality analysis simply
disciplines the inevitability of adjudicating conflicts between the interests
related to rights in a more explicit fashion than the categorical approach. But
if rights can be devalued by proportionality judgments, what is it about making
such judgments more explicit, as in Harper, that will better protect them?
The problem facing Jackson’s argument is that the way proportionality
devalues rights also distorts them. Just as Citizens United and Humanitarian
Law Project could be thought to devalue rights by balancing freedom of speech
against other interests, they would then both distort disagreements about the
scope of rights as disputes about the value of rights. Citizens United distorts
the question of about the scope of freedom of the press as a question about
the value of the freedom from identity-based speech suppression.
Humanitarian Law Project, on Jackson’s reading, takes the question of
whether speech that could aid terrorist violence is protected by the right against
content-based speech suppression and distorts it as a question about the value
of free speech when weighed against the state’s interest in combatting
terrorism.
The way Harper makes its value judgment about the
proportionality of infringing freedom of expression explicit does not express
the disagreement about how the scope of freedom of expression relates to
third-party campaign expenditures any more clearly.
It does not clarify a disagreement about the scope of rights to make their
resolution “explicitly” turn on a judgment about their value. To riff on a line
from the late Justice Scalia, this a bit like insisting that using a measuring tape
to weigh a rock would be more accurate than estimating its length with the
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See id. at 3139 (arguing that Humanitarian Law Project shows that during times of major security
threats, courts tend to apply a “less stringent means-ends test of whether the prohibition [on free
speech] could be said rationally to serve the government’s asserted interests”).
Id. at 3192.
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naked eye. 117 Breaking out a measuring tape is not going to help clarify a
disagreement about how much a rock weighs. It is going to confuse ordinary
folks and rock specialists alike. However, it is worth qualifying how this
conceptual argument relates to more empirical claims. It may be conceptually
true that proportionality distorts rights; it is a separate question whether such
distortions are in fact common or inevitable in American rights jurisprudence.
The ways that U.S. courts often use doctrines to resist making proportionality
judgments about rights helps underline why Jackson is mistaken to think of
such judgments are inevitable.
III. AMERICAN PROPORTIONALITY?
So far, I have argued that the framework of rights-as-proportionality
conceptually devalues and distorts constitutional rights. However, this does
not quite address Greene and Jackson’s institutional arguments for why rightsas-proportionality promises to improve the way American institutions resolve
disagreements about rights. They not only claim that proportionality analysis
can clarify the connection right and justice, but also that the institutional
consequence of courts employing this approach will be a more democratic
form of rights protection. 118 In Greene’s words, incorporating proportionality
analysis into American rights jurisprudence will help U.S. institutions better
respect what he rightly cherishes and calls “a democratic people’s first-order
right to govern itself.” 119 Pointing out how rights-as-proportionality can devalue
and distort rights does not directly address the institutional argument that
proportionality can help American courts and legislatures resolve rights
disagreements more democratically.
This is partly because the conceptual devaluation and distortions of
proportionality analysis could have varying effects on particular institutional
and political contexts. It is also partly a question as to what extent
proportionality analysis actually informs the way American judges reason
about rights under the tiers of scrutiny. If proportionality judgments
overriding rights are widespread, then this will could help undermine the case
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Here, I draw on Justice Scalia’s famous declaration that balancing rights is like trying to decide
“whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy.” Bendix Autolite Corp. v.
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3194; Greene, supra note 2, 128.
Greene, supra note 2, at 128.
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for expanding its role in U.S. rights adjudication to more transparently value
rights.
As such, before assessing how proportionality analysis can
institutionally disrupt the American model of rights protection, it will useful to
offer a rough sketch of the extent to which proportionality informs current
doctrines concerning constitutional rights.
This brief account does not follow the “hornbook sketch” of the tiers-ofscrutiny framework where certain classifications and rights are matched to
particular standards of review. 120 As was the case in Citizens United, it is
possible for supposedly categorical cases of strict scrutiny to rely on
proportionality judgments to strike down laws. On closer inspection, the
concept of courts allowing the state to proportionately override rights appears
to be as scattered across different doctrines and rights as the concept of
avoiding such proportionality judgments by specifying the scope of rights.
How prevalent is the disguised kind of proportionality judgment of
Citizens United in American tiers of scrutiny analysis? Although reading
Citizens United as a proportionality case indicates that American rights
adjudication may be less dominated by rights-as-trumps than Greene argues, I
make no claim to properly answer the empirical question of to what extent
supposedly categorical American cases collapse into proportionality
reasoning. This Part merely offers a brief sketch of the mixed record of
American uses of proportionality. 121 Some cases use the tiers of scrutiny in
ways that eschew proportionality reasoning about overriding rights, while
others appear to disguise such proportionality judgments. American rights
jurisprudence appears to be a mixture of rights-as-trumps and rights-asproportionality.
There are clearly strands of American rights adjudication that treat the
defined scope of rights as trumps. In some cases, resisting proportionality
takes the form of refusing to expand the scope of rights and leaving their
definition to the political process. We have already seen how, rightly or
wrongly, the U.S. Supreme Court refused to balance the right to free exercise
of religion in the majority opinion in Smith by holding that this right did not
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Greene, supra note 2, at 46.
Cf. SWEET & MATHEWS, supra note 5, at 97–119 (offering an alternative account of proportionality’s
relationship to the tiers of scrutiny that differs from this Article’s but supports the basic claim that the
record is mixed).
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extend to “otherwise prohibitable conduct.” 122
Another example is
Washington v. Glucksberg, in which the U.S. Supreme Court refused to
recognize the right to assisted suicide in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. 123 Instead, it insisted that fundamental rights must either be
textually based or “objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and
tradition[.]” 124 This essentially constituted a move away from the balancing of
due process rights, however tenuous it may have proven.
Various constitutional rights have also been protected against balancing by
judicial decisions defining the scope of rights using different doctrinal tests,
including compelling interest analysis under strict scrutiny. American judges
have sometimes used rational basis review and strict scrutiny to define and
defend the scope of different constitutional rights. In rational basis review
cases with bite, judges have sometimes justified striking down laws due to the
relationship between certain groups and their right to equal protection under
the law. Such cases often involve judges’ sense that animus threatens the equal
rights of groups such as hippies, 125 gays and lesbians, 126 short-term state
residents, 127 the mentally disabled, 128 and others. These cases might show
evidence of the inconsistency of the tiers of scrutiny, but they also involve
attempts by the Court to articulate how the scope of the right to equal
protection of the laws shields certain groups from specific kinds of animus.
These cases strike down laws for violating the equal protection of the laws from
public policy rooted in prejudice. This is arguably a haphazard way of defining
rights, but it does not involve justifying the benefits of such laws against the
“infringement” of an equality right.
There are many strict scrutiny cases, in particular in free speech doctrine,
that treat the scope of rights as a trumps. Citizens United notwithstanding, in
122
123
124
125

126
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128

Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–06 (1997).
Id. at 720–21 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 532–34 (1973) (holding that the Food Stamp Act
creates an irrational classification in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment by
intending to prevent hippies and hippie communes from participating in the food stamp program).
See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (finding no rational basis for amendment to state’s
constitution that would deny gays and lesbians the protection of antidiscrimination laws).
See Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 56 (1982) (finding no rational basis for an Alaskan law
distributing oil-revenues in an unequal fashion favoring long-term over short-term state residents).
See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) (finding no rational
basis for permit requirement imposed on a home for people with intellectual disabilities).
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modern free speech cases strict scrutiny has tended to exclude not only any
governmental interest in suppressing speech based on its content or viewpoint, 129 but even the judicial assessment of the value of speech. 130 Whether or
not these rules properly delimit the scope of the right to free speech, they seek
to define the scope of the right as freedom from governmental restrictions on
expression on the basis of the moral value of speech.
But proportionality style reasoning also permeates judicial reasoning about
many rights. In some cases, proportionality is openly used as a way of dealing
with rights that appear to require historically evolving standards that can be
applied across individual cases. An example of this is found in the Court’s
standard for scrutinizing the proportionality of sentences under the historically
“evolving standards of decency” of the Eighth Amendment’s protection against
cruel and unusual punishment. 131 Proportionality judgments also openly
appear under the Takings Clause in the heightened scrutiny given to how
conditions on zoning permits relate to the effects of the planned usage of
property. 132 In at least one older case, the Supreme Court has even explicitly
used the governmental interest in national security to justify upholding a law
entailing the compulsory disclosure of an organization’s membership that it
found “may in certain instances infringe constitutionally protected rights of
association.” 133
Other cases and areas of law may come closer to the camouflaged
proportionality analysis at work in Citizens United. In some strict scrutiny
cases, the Court asks whether the government has a compelling interest and
129

130

131
132
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See, e.g., Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (“[T]he First Amendment means
that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject
matter, or its content.” (citations omitted)); Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015)
(same).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech
does not extend only to categories of speech that survive an ad hoc balancing of relative social costs
and benefits.”).
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
See e.g., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591 (2013) (explaining that
the government cannot “condition the approval of a land-use permit on the owner’s relinquishment
of a portion of his property unless there is a ‘nexus’ and ‘rough proportionality’ between the
government’s demand and the effects of the proposed land use.”); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374, 392, 398 (1994) (stating that the government must show a “‘rough proportionality’ between the
harm caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained by the condition” (citation omitted)).
Communist Party of the U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1961) (citation
omitted).
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minimally overrides a right, but disguises this as an empirical inquiry. Paul
Yowell has convincingly argued that this was the case in Brown v.
Entertainment Merchants Association. 134 Brown concerned a California law
that prohibited the sale of violent video games to minors and whether that law
suppressed speech in violation of the First Amendment. 135 Justice Scalia’s
opinion relied on his own review of empirical evidence to reject a submission
by the state of California purporting to show a causal link between exposure
to violent video games and psychological harm to children. 136
Proportionality judgments can also be disguised by historical reasoning
about the original meaning of rights. This is arguably even true of District of
Columbia v. Heller, a case alternately celebrated and castigated (depending on
whom you ask) for its majority opinion’s clarion call against the kind of interest
balancing advocated by Justice Breyer. 137 Heller joins Citizens United as one
of the more controversial Supreme Court cases in recent history. The case
involved a five-justice majority opinion, penned by the late Justice Scalia,
holding that the District of Columbia’s requirement that all firearms be
disabled at all times and its ban on handguns violated the original meaning of
the Second Amendment’s protection for citizens’ right to bear arms. 138
Heller does more than Citizens United to specify the scope of the right
under consideration by making the historical case that the right to bear arms
was meant to protect the natural right to self-defense. 139 That is probably
enough to show that requiring firearms to be disabled at all times violates the
purpose protected by the right. 140 But Justice Scalia’s denunciation of both
legislative and judicial balancing is followed up by the claim that banning
handguns violated the purpose of the right to bear arms because “the
American people” consider “the handgun to be the quintessential self-defense
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YOWELL, supra note 1, at 37.
Brown v. Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 788–89 (2011).
Id. at 800.
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“Like the First [Amendment], [the
Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest balancing by the people—which JUSTICE
BREYER would now conduct for them anew.” (emphasis in original)).
Id. at 625, 636.
Id. at 635.
See id. at 630 (concluding that, by requiring firearms in the home be inoperable at all times, it is
“impossible for citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence
unconstitutional”).
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weapon.” 141 That is not a conclusion premised on historical evidence. This
judgment seems to turn on the value of handguns as a means of serving the
interest in self-defense, which Justice Scalia thinks would be disproportionately
impaired by banning handguns. Professor Nelson Lund has described this
argument as potentially engaging in “covertly Breyer-esque judicial interest
balancing[.]” 142 This reading of Heller indicates that Citizens United might not
be alone in masking proportionality reasoning under originalist pretensions.
The foregoing sketch indicates that American rights jurisprudence has a
mixed record when it comes to using proportionality analysis. In some cases
of strict scrutiny, proportionality is used to uphold or strike down laws; in some
cases of rational basis “with bite,” categorical judgments are used to define the
scope of rights as trumps. A more in-depth analysis would trace the history of
different uses of proportionality analysis in the development of the tiers of
scrutiny under the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts courts, 143 in the earlier
period where Justice Black contested the balancing of rights, 144 and even farther
back in the substantive due process of the Lochner era. 145 But a survey of
current American rights doctrines shows that proportionality style reasoning is
not a thing of the past, nor an unchallenged feature of the present. The record
is mixed, and this makes it difficult to say whether proponents of
proportionality are correct to trace the institutional disruption of rights
disagreements to right-as-trumps.
In at least some cases, their claims appear to target rights-as-proportionatetrumps; that is, they appear to trace the devaluation and distortion of right to
proportionality style reasoning. But it is difficult to say how widespread this is
because one must look beneath the tier of scrutiny deployed to find out
whether a court is using doctrine to balance or specify constitutional rights. In
turn, this makes it difficult to evaluate how institutionally disruptive the rightsas-trumps or rights-as-proportionality frameworks might be in the American
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Id. at 629.
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Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV.
1343, 1355 (2009).
See generally Fallon, supra note 32, at 1297–1302 (explaining that the general formula for strict
scrutiny remained largely the same, but the Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts courts added types of
“intermediate scrutiny”).
See Hugo L. Black, The Bill of Rights, 35 N.Y.U. L. REV. 865, 877–79 (1960) (stating that the
balancing rights test gives the government too much power and ignores the already carefully balanced
intricacies of the Constitution).
YOWELL, supra note 1 at 57–62.
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context. This renders the clear doctrinal usage of proportionality analysis in
Canada a useful point of comparison for evaluating the arguments of
proportionality’s American proponents. In the following Part, I shall argue
that Canadian style proportionality could institutionally disrupt the democratic
resolution of disagreements about American constitutional rights.
IV. DISRUPTED RIGHTS
At a glance, it might seem unfair to look to Canada in order to understand
the impact of expanding proportionality analysis in the United States. The
Canadian model of rights protection is the object of much comparative
adoration. While the U.S. Supreme Court is usually the prime piñata for
critics of the democratic credentials of judicial review, 146 these critics have often
been less willing, with some entertaining exceptions, 147 to beat up on the
Canadian Supreme Court. This is partly due to Canadian courts’ use of
proportionality analysis and partly a matter of the ability of the federal and
provincial legislatures to enact laws “notwithstanding” judicial rulings on
certain rights. 148 Proportionality analysis is taken by some comparative scholars
to help mitigate the democratic pathologies of judicial review across
constitutional contexts. 149 The open use of proportionality in the Canadian
context is envied by its American proponents as a key ingredient in what is
idealized as a more democratic model for protecting rights.
But the comparison is at the very least useful because the mixed record of
proportionality in the United States makes it hard to distinguish which cases
employ this methodology. The fact that Canadian courts openly use
146

147
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See Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 Yale L.J. 1346, 1348, 1650
(2006) (arguing that judicial review of legislation is “inappropriate as a mode of final decisionmaking
in a free and democratic society” and noting that critics attack judicial review in America).
See, e.g., JAMES ALLAN, DEMOCRACY IN DECLINE: STEPS IN THE WRONG DIRECTION 25–30
(2014) (comparing and contrasting the Canadian Supreme Court to the U.S. Supreme Court, and
noting that the Canadian court has a number of differences, including selection process and lack of
bicameralism, by which the author ultimately concludes that the Canadian court is less democratic
than the United States court).
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms § 33, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act, 1982, c 11 (U.K.).
See, e.g., Stephen Gardbaum, Proportionality and Democratic Constitutionalism, in
PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW: RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, REASONING 259, 270
(Grant Huscroft, Bradley W. Miller, & Grégoire Webber eds., 2014) (considering conflicts between
two constitutional rights from within the culture of democracy perspective).
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proportionality to justify “infringements” of rights, and Canada shares many
constitutional features with the United States, makes comparing the two
contexts instructive. More controversially, the comparison is also fair because
proportionality’s devaluations and distortions of rights disrupt the ability of
Canadian institutions to democratically resolve disagreements about rights.
Of course, it is important to note that American proponents of
proportionality do not simply want to cut and paste the Canadian “Oakes test”
into the U.S. context. For example, neither Greene nor Jackson recommends
uniting all rights analysis under one uniform Oakes style proportionality test. 150
Greene is also careful to write that in cases where there is no reasonable
disagreement that rights are threatened by prejudice, rights-as-trumps should
guide American rights jurisprudence. 151 He also thinks the paradigm cases of
American constitutional rights jurisprudence now concern “the potential
overreach or clumsiness of a government acting in good faith to solve actual
social problems[.]” 152
Jackson is more circumspect, arguing that
proportionality may not be appropriate for certain rights such as the First
Amendment’s protection for freedom of speech, 153 while benefitting others
such as the Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. 154
In spite of these caveats, Greene and Jackson both claim that reforming
the various strands of U.S. rights adjudication to resemble Canadian
proportionality doctrine will clarify rights disagreements and better value their
connection to justice. They both think that this will have the institutional effect
of allowing courts and legislatures to resolve rights disagreements in more
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Greene, supra note 2, at 60; Jackson, supra note 5, at 3166–67. At a Stanford Constitutional Law
Center conference on proposing amendments that would improve the U.S. Constitution, Greene
advocated amending the Constitution to qualify all of its rights to “limitations justified in a free and
democratic society.” Jamal Greene, Professor of Law, Columbia University, Panel at “A Big Fix:
Should We Amend Our Constitution?” at Stanford Law School’s Constitutional Law Center (May
12, 2017). This amendment drew on the exact language of section 1 of the Canadian Charter that
the Canadian Supreme Court used in Oakes to characterize “limits” on rights as “infringements”
justified by proportionality analysis. I was fortunate enough to comment on and criticize this
proposed amendment in light of the Canadian experience.
Greene, supra note 2, at 127–28.
Id. at 128.
Jackson, supra note 5, at 3168.
Id. at 3169.
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democratic ways, while also better protecting rights. 155 They join Justice Breyer
and other comparative scholars such as Stephen Gardbaum in thinking that
proportionality could help appease democratic skepticism about American
judicial review. 156 Unfortunately, scholars such as Greene and Jackson fail to
fully appreciate how proportionality’s devaluation and distortions of rights can
institutionally disrupt democracy by contributing to (a) rights inflation, (b)
undermining the classic justification for rights entrenchment and judicial
review, and (c) encouraging a pathological type of rights dialogue between
courts and legislatures.

A. Rights Inflation
The proportionality approach inflates the moral currency of rights in
democratic discourse. This contributes to the institutional disruption of how
courts, legislators, and ordinary citizens democratically deal with
disagreements about rights. Proponents of proportionality make the contrary
case that it is rights-as-trumps that impoverishes political discourse by inflating
constitutional rights. For instance, Greene thinks that rights-as-trumps have
been partly responsible for the dark “legal Guernica” of a hyperbolic and
oversensitive politics of unreasonable disagreement. 157 He claims this “dulls
the constitutional conscience of political actors by refusing to account for the
constitutional right of the community to embody its political vision in the
law.” 158 This is not new. Mary Ann Glendon and others have long made
similar arguments. 159 But what Greene’s account of the “inflated” deontic
moral value of rights fails to emphasize is how language inflating the value of
rights can stoke politically unreasonable rights rhetoric by allowing rights to be
overridden while expanding the scope and number of rights interests.
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Jackson, supra note 5, at 3142–44; see also Greene, supra note 2, at 60. Greene argues for moving
American rights jurisprudence in the direction of the Canadian emphasis on the “frames” of
standards over rules, particularism over universalism, empiricism over interpretation, and
justification over authority: “[t]he plea of this Foreword will be to move U.S. constitutional
adjudication closer than it is now to the proportionality end of those frames.” Id.
See, e.g., Gardbaum, supra note 149, at 260 (arguing that proportionality should enhance
democracy).
Greene, supra note 2, at 31–32.
Id. at 65 (emphasis in original).
See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that rights history in America has focused on individualism and liberty,
but has failed to champion rights of the community).
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It is hard to trace the effects of different conceptions of rights on popular
political discourse and institutional reasoning, but it seems plausible to say that
much of what Greene thinks of as the discursively pathological effects of rightsas-trumps talk can really be attributed to rights-inflation.
While
proportionality’s devaluation of rights is hardly the single cause for the inflation
of rights, it has likely contributed to it.
Proponents of proportionality argue that the way rights-as-trumps
discounts many of the complex interests constituting moral disagreements
about rights inflates the value of rights. Rights are disconnected from justice
by categorizing their protection for certain interests to trump and exclude the
consideration of other reasonable and relevant interests. According to
Greene, this treats only some interests as valuable and incentivizes the “zerosum” approach to many American rights disagreements where rights are “on
one side, bad faith on the other” and “conflict is reconcilable only at wholesale,
and without mercy to the loser.” 160 The inflated value of having one’s
cherished interest christened as a “right” lowers the value of treating competing
interests as reasonable.
This lays the blame for the “zero sum” nature of rights questions on how
the legal categorization of rights excludes and devalues interests reasonably
related to such questions. This account would actually entail the widespread
deflation of rights, in the sense of a constitutional culture where rights are
highly respected and rarely vindicated. In truth, much of the rancorous and
hyperbolic character of modern rights talk can, at least in part, be traced to the
ready willingness to equate interests with rights and the explosion of the
number and types of interests that can be thought of as rights. These are the
sources of rights-inflation. And proportionality reasoning encourages both of
these things.
Equating interests with rights does not invite reasonable compromise but
can instead embolden a rhetorical game that involves the denigration of
conflicting interests—even interests closely identified with the rights in
question. Part I of this Article argued against Greene that rights are
disconnected from justice not by categorization, but by treating rights as mere
defeasible interests. While almost any method of adjudication can devalue
the justice of rights by mistakenly defining or applying a right, proportionality
160

Greene, supra note 2, at 32.
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analysis is distinguished by its willingness to treat rights as interests subject to
interest balancing. 161 It is also possible to conceive of rights as protecting
certain interests, but without allowing such interests to be balanced once they
have been defined in relation to the persons and acts they protect. When
rights are interests prone to being overridden and balanced, the true standards
for evaluating which of the interests implicated in a rights dispute should be
vindicated becomes largely a matter of judicial moral judgment. 162
In courts, this incentivizes litigants to convince judges to either identify
their preferred interests with a right, or subordinate rights to their interests.
Conversely, they must denigrate and tarnish relevant interests that are at odds
with their own. This is why the majority opinion in Citizens United
concentrates on lecturing the dissent for not valuing free political speech rather
than on explaining why the interest in freedom from speaker-based
expenditure restrictions constitute part of freedom of speech. Outside of
courts, the all-or-nothing character of the moral disagreements can be
encouraged by the idea that even interests thought to define the core meaning
of rights, e.g. the right of newspapers to publish political criticism of the
government as freedom of the press, can be overridden for the sake of higher
interests. In legislatures, the idea that rights questions involve balancing
interests could paradoxically wash the hands of legislators of responsibility for
rights because all reasonable legislation seeks to balance interests. Why worry
about overriding rights when courts assume that this is the business of most
rights related legislation and adjudication?
The hyperbolic, winner-take-all character of much rights rhetoric and
argument may also be partly traceable to the proliferation of the number and
scope of interests considered to be protected by rights. Where rights interests
are ubiquitous it becomes all the more important to assert the value of the
rights interests one prefers and deny any merit to conflicting interests. It is an
open question of how much the judicial use of proportionality analysis
influences or is influenced by the inflation of rights as commonplace interests
in popular political morality. But it seems likely that proportionality reasoning
has some influence on political discourse, as it undoubtedly deflates rights by
expanding the scope and number of interests they protect. Greene himself
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YOWELL, supra note 1, at 27–30.
Greene, supra note 2, at 109–14.

164

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 23:1

cites Kai Möller’s unabashed observation that a feature of proportionality
analysis is “the increasing protection of relatively trivial interests as (prima
facie) rights.” 163 He also discusses the use of proportionality by the German
Federal Constitutional Court to find that the “right to free development of
one’s personality” under Basic Law’s Article 2(1) protects “the feeding of
pigeons on streets and in public places as an expression of love of animals.” 164
While this is only one case, it indicates how rights inflation can disrupt
democratic rights discourse in a fashion similar to the way monetary inflation
can upset an economy.
The German Court justified the law restricting this right as a means of
serving “the interest of the community as a whole” by preventing property
damage while only exercising a “very limited interference with the freedom to
exercise the love of animals.” 165 Although Greene does not necessarily agree
with this degree of rights inflation, he thinks it “useful . . . as a contrast dye”
with the categorical approach. 166 He notes that American courts would be
unlikely to entertain such a right, as these kinds of claims only fall under
substantive due process if they implicate fundamental rights involving
“personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy” 167 or essential to
the American “scheme of ordered liberty” 168 or “deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition.” 169 This restricts the number and scope of rights interests
recognized by U.S. courts, and Greene thinks this orients American rights
discourse towards its scorched earth trajectory.
But isn’t a citizen challenging a local ordinance against feeding pigeons as
a violation of her “right to develop her personality” a sign of a societal
breakdown in good-faith reasonable disagreement about rights? Arguing that
a right to develop one’s personality by feeding pigeons should outweigh a
community’s rules for protecting its property projects absolute value onto a
right and denigrates reasonable interests related to it. Neither a system that
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Id. at 58 (quoting KAI MÖLLER, THE GLOBAL MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 3 (2012)).
Id. at 57 (citing Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 23, 1980, 54
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS [BVERFGE] 143 ¶ 2(d) (Ger.)). Error!
Hyperlink reference not valid.
54 BVerfGE 143 2(d). All translations of German language cases are author’s own.
Greene, supra note 2, at 57.
Id. (quoting Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015)).
Id. (quoting McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 767 (2010).
Id. (quoting McDonald, 561 U.S. at 767).

January 2021]

THROUGH CANADIAN EYES

165

allows such frivolous and unreasonable assertions of rights to clog its courts’
dockets, nor a society that supplies such assertions is treating rights reasonably.
The Canadian Supreme Court’s uses of proportionality analysis have
stopped short of recognizing a right to feed pigeons in parks, and it has even
admitted that “[t]here is no free-standing constitutional right to smoke ‘pot’ for
recreational purposes.” 170 In spite of that admission, the majority of the court
went on to justify infringing the “liberty interest” of the recreational pot user,
robbing their admission of its force. 171 Justices Arbour and LeBel dissented
because they judged that the societal interests advanced by the law
criminalizing marijuana possession was disproportionate to the liberty interest
of the smoker. 172 Justice Deschamps also dissented on the grounds that J.S.
Mill’s principle that only harm to others can justify infringing liberty is
incorporated into the Charter principles of “fundamental justice,” and
marijuana use merely harms the user. 173 Assessing liberty as an abstract interest
inflated the scope of the right to encompass smoking pot for recreational
purposes.
There are other examples where Canadian courts have used
proportionality to puff up rights, even if only to override them. Consider the
question of child pornography.
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court’s
categorization of child pornography as outside the scope of free speech, 174 the
Canadian Supreme Court has used proportionality analysis to recognize the
possession of child pornography as an interest protected by the freedom of
expression. 175
The court accepted the government’s proportionality
justification for infringing this right and even claimed that “the possession of
child pornography must be forbidden to prevent harm to children.” 176 As
Grégoire Webber et al. have noted, this inflates the idea of the right to
freedom of expression to such an extent that for the court “there are
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R. v. Malmo-Levine, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 571, para. 87 (Can.).
Id. at para. 89.
Id. at para. 280.
See id. at para. 295 (“[M]oderate use of marihuana is harmless. Thus, it seems doubtful that it is
appropriate to classify marihuana consumption as conduct giving rise to a legitimate use of criminal
law in light of the Charter.”).
New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982).
See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, paras. 5, 27 (Can.) (balancing the limitation to freedom of
expression against the harm that possession of child pornography can cause to children).
Id. at para. 29 (emphasis added).
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conclusive reasons for acting contrary to the right: for the legislature to respect
the pornographer’s freedom of expression would be to act unjustly or
unjustifiably.” 177 This is one more example of how this approach has
encouraged a confused rights discourse that has warped Canada’s ability to
treat rights reasonably. Of course, the mixture of rights-as-trumps and rightsas-proportionality in the American tiers of scrutiny makes it more difficult to
say whether courts have contributed to rights inflation in the United States. 178
But the link between Canadian and German uses of proportionality analysis
and rights inflation is not encouraging.
A healthy rights discourse, where political actors are responsible and
electorally accountable for sorting out disagreements about rights, will not
feature widespread attempts to elevate trivial interests above democratic
decision-making. When a central bank heedlessly prints money, prices can
skyrocket, and people can become desperate to afford even basic items.
Analogously, proportionality’s complicity in stretching and proliferating rights
can act as a reason for the polarized desperation of rights-claims that are worth
less due to their increased supply.

B. Undermining Enumeration and Judicial Review
Two important reasons why many critics of judicial review are uneasy with
the entrenchment of bills of rights is that they fear that such legal rights will not
settle most moral disagreements about rights, 179 while inviting unelected courts
to nevertheless use enumerated rights to reverse democratic settlements. 180
Courts treating rights as just trumps does risk reversing past democratic
settlements to moral disagreements about the meaning of enumerated rights.
However, treating rights as interests that are subject to proportionality analysis
can unsettle moral agreements and compromises related to enumerated rights
by reversing democratic settlements about unenumerated rights beyond any
legal mandate for adjudication. This undermines a key justification of
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GRÉGOIRE WEBBER ET AL., LEGISLATED RIGHTS: SECURING HUMAN RIGHTS THROUGH
LEGISLATION 38 (2018) (emphasis in original).
Thank you to Dan Walters for helping to clarify this point.
See JEREMY WALDRON, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, in POLITICAL POLITICAL
THEORY: ESSAYS ON INSTITUTIONS 195, 211 (2016) (arguing that bills of rights do not resolve moral
disagreements about rights).
See id. at 226–33 (arguing that judicial review of indeterminate rights is a less democratic decision
procedure than a majoritarian one).
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entrenchment and feeds rather than assuages the democratic fears of critics of
judicial review.
Moral disagreements about rights questions are complicated by
constitutionally enumerated rights, as evidenced in Citizens United and
Harper. Where a right is not only subject to vigorous good faith moral
disagreement, but also touches on rights enumerated in a constitutional bill of
rights, legal arguments about the meaning of the relevant enumerated rights
are inevitably pulled into the political sphere. The most trenchant critics of
judicial review go so far as to decry the very entrenchment of rights because
they think this gravitational pulling of law into politics distorts moral
disagreements about rights and grants courts undemocratic powers in resolving
them. 181
The most influential argument along these lines holds that where there are
basically functional democratic and judicial institutions, and where citizens
engage in numerous good faith disagreements about rights left unsettled by a
bill of rights, it will violate the right of citizens to an equal say in resolving such
questions for an unelected court to determine the meaning of such rights as
part of its interpretive task. 182 Notice that presupposing that legally entrenched
rights are indeterminate distinguishes this argument from the distinct
Jeffersonian claim that even the judicial enforcement of the determinate
meaning of entrenched rights generates inter-generational inequalities. 183
With Greene, we can accept the force of this argument without rejecting
constitutional bills of rights and judicial review tout court. 184 But our analysis
of the rights devaluation and distortions of proportionality analysis allows us
to see how it can exacerbate the difficulties pointed to by critics of rights
entrenchment and judicial review. Greene accepts the points scored by these
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See generally RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE OF
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY 28 (2007) (arguing that incorporating a bill of rights
can produce rather than restrain arbitrary rule).
See WALDRON, supra note 179, at 199 (arguing that judicial review is undemocratic because it
privileges a small number of unelected judges to determine the final resolution of issues about rights
and disenfranchises ordinary citizens).
See generally Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Sept. 6, 1789), in 12 THE PAPERS
OF JAMES MADISON 382 (Charles Hobson et al. eds., 1979) (considering whether one generation of
men is entitled to bind another later generation of men).
Greene, supra note 2, at 88.
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critics, but then chalks them up as counting against rights-as-trumps. 185 He
claims that critics of judicial review should be placated by proportionality
analysis because it addresses the interests at stake in rights questions directly,
“rather than through the smoke of precedent and doctrinal formulae.” 186
Allowing judges to weigh rights as interests devalues even the clear meaning
of entrenched rights by permitting them to be overridden. As such,
proportionality analysis erodes one of the conditions that could help justify
constitutional judicial review: that it values and enforces the past democratic
enactments of a political community.
And Greene and Jackson’s hope that proportionality will transparently
address the interests at stake in rights questions is betrayed by the way it distorts
rights while allowing judges to control their meaning. Proportionality analysis
encourages litigants to present their disagreements about rights not as
concerning the scope of any given right, but rather as what Jeremy Waldron
calls a “rights-misgiving” about taking a right “to an extreme or applying it in
cases where other important interests (for example, survival or security) are
much more urgently engaged.” 187
This elevates courts to making moral and empirical judgments about the
value of rights in public policy controversies without any direct accountability
to citizens. Those who object to Citizens United extending freedom of speech
to protect against laws targeting speakers based on their identity are caricatured
as insufficiently valuing free speech; those opposed to the restrictions on third
party freedom of expression upheld in Harper are cast as insufficiently valuing
equal political expression, or even seeking to dominate their fellow citizens. 188
In both cases, the courts rely on moral intuitions to interfere with a reasonable
disagreement about the moral meaning of entrenched rights. 189
That reliance on moral intuitions pulls the rug out from Alexander
Hamilton’s famous justification of judicial independence in relation to the
“knowledge of the laws” possessed by judges. 190 One does not rely on
185

See id. (“[R]ights as trumps front-loads questions of rights definitions that judges . . . address
mechanistically.”).
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Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue Between Judges and Legislators, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV.
(2d) 7, 17–18 (2004).
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, para. 107 (Can.).
Id.; see also Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 356 (2010).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81 (Alexander Hamilton).
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knowledge of law to assess whether restrictions on third-party spending
justifiably infringe the right to freedom of expression. The judgment that a
right can be justifiably infringed is at least partly a moral one, although it’s
unclear what moral standard renders the different interests at stake in such
disagreements commensurable. 191 It is difficult to democratically justify the
shielding of such moral judgments by constitutional independence, as there is
no reason to think that judicial judgments about the moral value of freedom
of speech or equal political expression deserve to be privileged over those of
zookeepers, librarians, or any other societal role. This also arbitrarily
privileges the powers of whichever side or faction of a rights disagreement
shares relevant moral values with a majority of the court. 192
This problem will not comfort the critic of judicial review. On the
contrary, it ought to contribute to democratic skepticism about entrenching
rights that are subject to judicial proportionality analysis.

C. Interrogative Dialogue
In response to these arguments, proportionality’s American fans might
reply that it allows for the renegotiation of rights commitments made in the
past through a democratic kind of “dialogue” between courts and legislatures.
This strand of thinking could rely on the distinct premise that even if legal
rights could settle and guide moral rights disagreements, the constriction of
entrenched legal rights in the past suppresses the equal right of living citizens
to settle their disagreements in the present. On this argument, rights inflation
could be limited by sensible proportionality judgments about rights made by
interactive negotiations between courts and legislatures, and these negotiations
could democratically free citizens from the grip of rigid commitments made
by past generations. Or perhaps Greene and Jackson might contend that
moral disagreement about the meaning of rights extends radically to the
methods for interpreting their meaning, such that rights must be continually
renegotiated in dialogues between courts and legislatures about their present
value.
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See FRANCISCO J. URBINA, A CRITIQUE OF PROPORTIONALITY AND BALANCING 46–74 (2017)
(explaining the incommensurability objection to proportionality).
F.L. MORTON & RAINER KNOPFF, THE CHARTER REVOLUTION AND THE COURT PARTY 162
(2000).
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Either argument would appear to follow the Canadian Supreme Court’s
suggestion in cases such as R. v. Mills, 193 Vriend v. Alberta, 194 Sauvé v. Canada
(Chief Electoral Officer), 195 and even Chief Justice McLachlin’s dissent in
Harper, 196 that legislative replies to judicial decisions create a “dialogue
between and accountability of each of the branches [to one another]” that has
“the effect of enhancing the democratic process[.]” 197 The problem with this
counter-argument is that proportionality analysis encourages what I have
argued elsewhere is an undemocratic interrogative type of rights dialogue. 198
The general promise of dialogue is that it will allow legislatures to respond
to judicial decisions, and courts to further review such replies, and so on, such
that rights are democratically negotiated and protected by both legislation and
adjudication. 199 Proportionality analysis orients courts to interrogate legislative
reasons and means for violating rights rather than reviewing the consistency of
laws with the scope and nature of rights. 200 In turn, this could orient legislatures
and citizens influenced by judicial decisions to an inflated understanding of
rights as interests. Because courts using proportionality categorize most
legislative enactments as justified or unjustified “infringements,” this could
encourage legislatures to get in the habit of infringing rights. It could also
become natural for citizens to get in the habit of electorally holding their
legislatures accountable for justifiably or unjustifiably infringing rights. 201
Interactions between elected legislatures and unelected courts will resemble
interrogations about a criminal’s reasons for breaking the law rather than the
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R v. Mills, [1999] 3 S.C.R 668, para. 57 (Can.) (“This Court has also discussed the relationship
between the courts and the legislature in terms of a dialogue . . . .”).
Vriend v. Alberta, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 493, paras. 137–42 (Can.) (describing the interaction between the
branches of Canadian government as a “dialogue”).
Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519, para. 17 (Can.) (portraying the
posture of courts towards legislatures as alternating between deference and vigilance).
Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827, para. 37 (Can.) (“Parliament’s good faith
is advanced . . . by the ongoing dialogue with the courts . . . .”).
Vriend, 1 S.C.R. at para. 139.
Geoffrey Sigalet, On Dialogue and Domination, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: RIGHTS,
DEMOCRACY, INSTITUTIONS 85, 86 (Geoffrey Sigalet et al. eds., 2019).
Geoffrey Sigalet, Grégoire Webber & Rosalind Dixon, The ‘What’ and ‘Why’ of Constitutional
Dialogue, in CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE: RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY, INSTITUTIONS, supra note
198, at 1, 4.
Sigalet, supra note 198, at 109.
Id. at 123.
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whether or not the law was broken. 202 The legislature is “presumed guilty until
proven utilitarian.” 203 Insofar as such rights disagreements become election
issues, the citizens will be habituated to voting about whether the governing
political parties in the legislature unjustifiably violated or justifiably infringed
rights. The effect of dropping questions of the scope of rights from
jurisprudence could contribute to erasing such questions from the democratic
process.
It may be that the moral value of entrenched rights should be up for
renegotiation. Alternatively, it could be true that moral disagreement clouds
the ability of methods of adjudication to guide moral disagreements about
rights. Either way, it does not follow that courts will protect democracy by
renegotiating rights in this interrogative fashion. In either case, enabling courts
to interrogate the reasons and means by which legislatures may override rights
could discourage legislative and popular concern for renegotiating the scope
and nature of rights. This is because negotiating the value of rights, even in
the face of moral disagreement about the methods of interpreting their legal
meaning, presupposes the need for some degree of legislative control over
their scope and nature. We cannot democratically renegotiate the value of a
right if we don’t care for what the scope of that right is. And as discussed
above, proportionality analysis will orient legislatures to negotiate misgivings
about the value of rights rather than disagreements about the scope of rights.
This undemocratically cedes control of the scope of rights to unelected courts
and corrupts rights disagreements.
Of course, legislatures may end up articulating judgments about the scope
of rights when they are mischaracterized as contesting judicial value judgments
about the proportionate “infringement” of rights. And it also seems plausible
that factors other than proportionality analysis are responsible for discouraging
legislatures from articulating their own judgments about the scope of rights. It
may be that what really gets in the way of legislatures articulating the scope of
rights are complex rules of standing, precedent, res judicata, or the basic idea
that articulating the scope of constitutional rights falls to the adjudicative
function. These considerations do not change the truth that framing legislative
replies to judicial decisions as justified infringements of rights can make it
more difficult for legislatures to articulate their own views about the scope of
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rights. In the distorting light of judicial decisions using proportionality analysis,
disagreements with courts about the scope of rights will be cast as objections
to rights themselves, sometimes even by factions within the coalitions
controlling the legislature. Even if variables such as rules of standing,
precedent, res judicata, and respect for the judicial authority over the scope of
constitutional rights are the primary obstacles to legislative participation in
rights dialogues, there is reason to think that proportionality analysis can
compound these difficulties. This feature of proportionality analysis can be
discerned across both the Canadian and American contexts.
The comparison of Canadian and American rights jurisprudence is once
again instructive. Basic features of Canadian constitutionalism appear to
reduce the ability of variables other than proportionality analysis to obstruct
legislative articulations of rights at odds with prior judicial decisions. Although
it shares something like the American state action doctrine, 204 compared to the
United States, Canada has a much looser standing regime for rights claims,
lacks a political question doctrine, 205 and its supreme court is comparatively
less strict about precluding re-litigated rights claims under stare decisis and res
judicata. 206 Politically, the federal Canadian Senate lacks the democratic
legitimacy of the U.S. Senate, and the provincial legislatures are unicameral,
making laws easier to pass in response to controversial judicial decisions. 207
Yet in spite of what looks like a more welcoming constitutional
environment for legislative participation in dialogues about the scope of rights,
there is evidence suggesting that proportionality analysis has discouraged such
dialogue. Even in cases where Parliament appears to articulate its own
understanding of rights, proportionality appears to exacerbate the difficulties
it faces in doing so. Conversely, there are American uses of right-as-trumps
that appear to have encouraged more robust Congressional articulations of
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See RWDSU v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 573, 574 (Can.) (“The Charter does not
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See Operation Dismantle Inc. v. La Reine, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441, 465–66 (Can.) (rejecting the political
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court to uphold a law which is unconstitutional.”).
Reference Re. Senate Reform [2014] 1 S.C.R. 704, para. 60, and Constitution Act, 1867 section 24
(Governor General’s appointment of Senators); see, e.g., sections 69 (for the unicameralism of the
Ontario legislature), (U.K.), 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3.
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constitutional rights. This is in spite of the features of American
constitutionalism that might present greater obstacles to such constructive
responses. And in the case of at least one such prominent response, the U.S.
Supreme Court seems to have used proportionality analysis to help shut down
a more constructive rights dialogue.
Consider a recent Canadian example. The Parliament of Canada arguably
contested the understanding of the Charter rights to life, liberty, and security
of person animating the supreme court’s invalidation in Carter v. Canada
(Attorney General) of criminal restrictions on aiding and abetting assisted
suicide. 208 In Carter, the court invalidated these restrictions as violations of the
right to life, liberty, and security of person “insofar as they prohibit physicianassisted death for a competent adult person who (1) clearly consents to the
termination of life; and (2) has a grievous and irremediable medical condition
. . . that causes enduring suffering that is intolerable to the individual in the
circumstances[.]” 209 This standard was explicitly tied to the circumstances of
the plaintiffs in Carter, 210 and Parliament and the provincial legislatures were
invited to respond “should they so choose, by enacting legislation consistent
with the constitutional parameters set out in these reasons.” 211 Parliament
eventually took up this invitation with a bill that restricted access to medically
assisted dying to consenting adult patients whose “natural death has become
reasonably foreseeable, taking into account all of their medical circumstances”
and are “in an advanced state of irreversible decline in capability[.]” 212
The evidence from the preamble to the bill, debate in the House of
Commons and the Minister of Justice’s “Charter statement” on the rights
consistency of its bill all suggest that the government sought to restrict the
scope of the right to die to protect the rights of underage, disabled, elderly,
and other vulnerable persons, and to generally prevent suicide. The
enactment’s conditions were arguably more restrictive than the court
envisioned, and constitutional experts were quick to claim that, in not
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Carter v. Canada (Attorney General), [2015] 1 S.C.R. 331, paras. 2–3 (Can.).
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An Act to amend the Criminal Code and to make related amendments to other Acts (medical
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conforming to the court’s decision, the government’s legislative proposal was
inconsistent with the Charter. 213
In the face of these objections, the Minister of Justice, Jody WilsonRaybould, emphasized that judicial understandings of rights are not final as
“nobody has a monopoly on interpreting the Charter[.]” 214 She signaled her
support for Parliamentary autonomy in specifying the scope of Charter rights
by remarking that:
it falls to Parliament not only to respect the court’s decision, but also to listen
to diverse voices and decide what the public interest demands. It is never as
simple as simply cutting and pasting the words from a court’s judgment into a
new law. 215

Canadian legal scholars such as Dennis Baker are correct to characterize
the government’s legislative proposal as an independent legislative articulation
of the scope of rights. 216 What such arguments miss is how the judicial use of
proportionality analysis in Carter was used to characterize any deviation from
the judicial scope conditions on the right to die as a violation of the right itself.
Indeed, this contributed to the attempted political sabotage of the provisions
of the bill reflecting Parliament’s independent judgment on the scope of the
right to assisted suicide. Once the initial bill passed to the Senate, the Liberal
Senator Serge Joyal noted that the government’s bill was “an initiative to limit
the class of people who have received the right according to the Supreme
Court to resort to medical assistance in dying.” 217
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Presentation to the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Bill C-14
(medical assistance in dying), 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament (2016) (statement of Peter W. Hogg, a
prominent constitutional expert, arguing that Bill-C-14 attempted to establish a limitation to the right
granted in Carter that was inconsistent with the ruling itself); 150(50) DEBS. OF THE S., 1st Sess., 42nd
Parliament, at 1135–36 (June 15, 2016) (statement of Hon. Claudette Tardiff arguing that since the
goal of medically assisted death was compassion, Bill C-14 was too restrictive),
https://sencanada.ca/en/speeches/speech-by-senator-serge-joyal-during-the-third-reading-of-bill-c-14medical-assistance-in-dying-amendment-joyal/.
148(55) H. OF COMMONS DEBS., 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, at 3310 (May 13, 2016) (statement of
Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould).
148(45) H. OF COMMONS DEBS., 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, at 2581 (Apr. 22, 2016) (statement of
Hon. Jody Wilson-Raybould).
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150(45) DEBS. OF THE S., 1st Sess., 42nd Parliament, at 935 (June 8, 2016) (statement of Hon. Serge
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The unelected Senator’s rhetoric used proportionality analysis to reject
narrowing the scope of the right to die because, in Carter:
[t]he court was already seized with an allegation from the lawyers of the
government that the prohibition for everyone not to have access to medical
assistance in dying could be saved . . . to protect the vulnerable, to enhance
the sanctity of life, to prevent suicide . . . objectives of social policies that are
certainly sound but that are too broad to deprive a person who is adult,
competent, in a grievous and irremediable health condition and suffers
intolerably from having access to medical assistance in dying. 218

Senator Joyal’s reasoning shows how proportionality can orient what
should be debates about the scope of a right towards a debate about the
justification for depriving citizens of a right. Those who supported the
government’s bill were forced to defend its specifications of who should have
the right to medically assisted dying as contesting the permitted reasons for
infringing this newly discovered right.
The Senator used the court’s proportionality judgment to convince a
majority of his Senate colleagues that Parliament could not consider interests
such as suicide prevention in crafting its response to Carter without violating
the newly discovered constitutional right to assisted death. The Senate sent a
version of the bill without the impugned conditions back to House. 219
Although the Senate’s amendments were rejected and the House’s version of
the bill was eventually enacted, it is quite striking that, even in the case of a bill
meant to enact a novel right articulated by a supreme court overturning its own
precedent, 220 political factions of a governing party managed to use the language
of proportionality to characterize the prospective law as a violation of that right.
Overall, the Canadian experience indicates that interrogative dialogue
reduces the chance the legislators and their voters will contest the scope limits
and valuations judges place on rights using proportionality analysis. This is
partly because of the way proportionality-based decisions empower minority
political factions to sabotage legislative responses to judicial decisions as in
Carter, but also because legislatures generally have little appetite for appearing
to contest judicial valuations of rights. The federal and provincial legislatures
have only rarely responded to judicial decisions invalidating their statutes as
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unjustified infringements of Charter rights. 221 And unlike American
legislatures, section 33 of the Charter grants them the ability to formally
insulate their legislation from judicial invalidation for renewable periods of five
years.
Critics of judicial review have tended to blame the reluctance of Canadian
legislatures in using the notwithstanding clause on the widespread perception
that laws invoking section 33 override Charter rights. 222 The thought is that this
forces legislatures that disagree with judicial decisions “to pretend to be
brushing rights aside, whereas it might want to say that it is brushing aside
mistaken interpretations of rights.” 223 What these critics fail to appreciate is
how the Canadian proportionality approach to rights developed in Oakes
turns even most ordinary statutes into “infringements” of rights. 224 Canadian
judges have combined their understanding of dialogue with proportionality to
uphold legislation that comports with their values, but rarely to countenance
real disagreement.
How does this compare to the American context? It may be implausible
to say that a more democratically constructive form of dialogue informs
interactions between American courts and legislatures about rights. Certainly,
both the U.S. and Canadian Supreme Courts make occasional institutional
claims to be the exclusive interpreter of constitutional rights. 225 In both
contexts, these claims of supremacy are at odds with the potential for dialogues
between the branches that construct the scope of rights. However, there are
American legislative responses to judicial decisions where rights-as-trumps
appears to have encouraged the legislative construction of rights. Conversely,
proportionality style reasoning appears to have contributed to judicial attempts
to shut down rather than engage with such legislative constructions.
221

222
223
224

225

See Emmett Macfarlane, Dialogue or Compliance? Measuring Legislatures’ Policy Responses to
Court Rulings on Rights, 34 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 39, 47 (2012) (determining that the legislature only
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See, e.g., Waldron, supra note 187, at 34–39.
Id. at 38.
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See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (per curiam) (“[T]he federal judiciary is supreme
in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.”); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002]
3 S.C.R. 519, para. 17 (Can.) (discussing that the court should not defer to Parliament’s interpretation
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Consider the legislative response to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1990 refusal
in Smith to find rights to the free exercise of religion in “otherwise prohibitable
conduct” motivated by religious convictions. 226 The Court was clear that it
preferred to leave the protection of such rights to the political process. 227
Congress responded in 1993 with a law, the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (“RFRA”), that enacted federal statutory protections requiring the
government to justify burdens it imposes on religious exercise as the “least
restrictive” fashion and to further a “compelling governmental interest.” 228
These requirements were essentially statutory protections for the more
substantive understanding of the scope of the Free Exercise Clause rejected in
Smith. 229 They applied to the federal government, but also to the states
pursuant to Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
to “enforce” the Amendment by passing “appropriate legislation.” 230
The Congressional deliberations about RFRA were explicitly critical of the
Supreme Court’s refusal to recognize a more substantive right to religious free
exercise. 231 Both the Senate and the House exhibited open criticism of Smith
as a mistaken interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause that would leave many
important religious practices open to interference by formally neutral laws and
regulations. For instance, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary heard
testimony regarding how Smith entailed the constitutionality of facially neutral
226
227
228

229

230
231

Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
Id. at 890.
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, § 3, 107 Stat. 1488, 1489 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb), invalidated by City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
Michael W. McConnell, Institutions and Interpretation: A Critique of City of Boerne v. Flores, 111
HARV. L. REV. 153, 161 (1997).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.

See The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1–2 (1992) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (criticizing the elimination of the
“compelling interest test” that required stronger justification by the Government in order to interfere
with the free exercise of religion); Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on H.R. 2797 Before
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 33–
34 (1992) (statement by Mark E. Chopko, General Counsel, on behalf of U.S. Catholic Conference)
(arguing that while the “compelling interest test” was not a “panacea” for religion, the implications in
abrogating from that test nonetheless loom large for religious institutions); Religious Freedom

Restoration Act: Hearing on H.R. 5377 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of
the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 49 (1991) (statement by Rev. John H. Buchanan, Jr.,
Chairman, People for the American Way Action Fund) (“We are united in support of this legislation
because it seeks to protect the fundamental principle of religious freedom, which was indeed
undermined by the Supreme Court in the Smith decision.”).
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laws requiring autopsies over the religious objections of animist and Jewish
families, 232 the use of neutral zoning laws to close down churches, 233 neutral
rules withdrawing the accreditation of residency programs in Catholic hospitals
that refuse to perform abortions on religious grounds, 234 etc. Congress took
up Justice Scalia’s challenge by weighing what he referred to in Smith as the
“social importance” of ordinary laws with the “centrality of religious beliefs” to
conclude that protecting the full scope of the right to free exercise was more
important than maintaining the full enforcement of social policies. 235 RFRA
arguably exemplified a quintessential legislative judgment about the value of
the policy discretion that would be displaced by fully protecting the scope of a
right while directing courts to the quintessential adjudicative task of applying
the scope of that right on a case-to-case basis. 236
As we shall see, the Supreme Court’s reaction to RFRA was antithetical to
constructive dialogue. Even so, RFRA itself can be understood as a legislative
construction of the right to free exercise that was spurred by a judicial refusal
to engage in proportionality analysis. Congress was likely emboldened by
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment’s explicit authorization to
“enforce” the rights it incorporates against the states by “appropriate
legislation.” 237 Whereas debates in the Canadian Parliament about Carter were
framed by its language as concerning whether limits on state-funded medically
assisted dying were proportionate infringements of the right to die, the
response to Smith involved robust disagreement with the Court about the
scope of the right to the free exercise of religion. Scalia’s refusal to balance
rights in Smith 238 resulted in Congress taking responsibility for extending the
scope of the right to religious free exercise as a trump to be applied across
individual cases by courts. To be sure, the contrast cannot be wholly attributed
to the Canadian Supreme Court’s use of proportionality analysis in Carter and
the U.S. Supreme Court’s refusal to balance right in Smith. But it does suggest

232

233
234

235
236
237
238

The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
102d Cong. 9 (1992).
Id. at 64.
See id. at 72 (noting testimony of Prof. Douglas Laycock (citing St. Agnes Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F.
Supp. 319, 319 (D. Md. 1990))).
Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
McConnell, supra note 229, at 192.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
Smith, 494 U.S. at 889.
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that understanding rights-as-trumps may not be as inimical to constructive
dialogue as proponents of proportionality might think.
What happened after RFRA indicates why it is implausible to say that
American courts and legislatures robustly engage in democratic and
constructive dialogues about rights. However, once again proportionality style
reasoning played a role in undermining such dialogue. For a period, litigation
under RFRA allowed a number of successful free exercise claims against laws
and regulations that might have been upheld under Smith. 239 But government
defendants soon challenged the constitutionality of the RFRA as it applied to
state and local governments. One of these challenges, Flores v. City of Boerne
(pronounced “Bernie”), arose from a suit filed by the Catholic Archbishop of
San Antonio on behalf of a church contesting the City’s refusal to approve any
remodeling plan that would damage the church building. 240 The district court
ruled RFRA to be an unconstitutional violation of “the doctrine of the
Separation of Powers by intruding on the power and duty of the judiciary.” 241
The case made its way to the Supreme Court solely on the question of the
constitutionality of RFRA, and in a 6-3 majority opinion by Justice Kennedy
the Court held the law unconstitutional as it applied to state and local
governments. 242
The majority opinion in Flores combined a proportionality judgment with
a raw assertion of judicial supremacy. It held that the application of Congress’
understanding of the Free Exercise Clause to state and local governments
violated the separation of powers and federalism. 243 The Court framed the
choice concerning Congress’ exercise of the Section 5 power as either allowing

239

240
241
242
243

See, e.g., Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm’n v. Cath. Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 467–70 (D.C. Cir.
1996) (holding that the EEOC’s and plaintiff’s claims against Catholic University were barred by the
Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and by RFRA); W. Presbyterian Church v. Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 862 F. Supp. 538, 544–46 (D.D.C. 1994) (holding that plaintiff Church’s program was
religious conduct falling within the protections of the First Amendment and RFRA); Bessard v. Cal.
Cmty. Colls., 867 F. Supp. 1454, 1462–65 (E.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that requiring plaintiffs to take
an oath that violates their religious tenets as a condition to being considered for public employment
violates their right to free exercise); Porth v. Roman Cath. Diocese, 432 N.W.2d 195, 197 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that RFRA bars the application of Michigan’s Civil Rights Act to defendant’s
conduct).
Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1354 (5th Cir. 1996).
Flores v. City of Boerne, 877 F. Supp. 355, 357 (W.D. Tex. 1995).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997).
Id.
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substantive power by which congressional majorities could change the
Constitution, 244 or remedial power, by which Congress can enact mechanisms
such as causes of action, fines, etc., to “prevent, as well as remedy,
constitutional violations” exclusively defined by the Court. 245
The Court then relied on dubious history 246 about the reconstruction era
to affirm the remedial view and reject the substantive understanding of Section
5. 247 This historical justification of the remedial view eschewed any discussion
of a middle ground between allowing Congress to change the Constitution, or
restricting it to remedying violations of rights as interpreted by the Court. 248
The Court used this remedial view to treat RFRA’s disagreement with Smith
about the scope of free exercise rights as an attempt to enact “a substantive
change in constitutional protections.” 249 RFRA was then assessed for whether
the means by which it prohibited state action to remedy or prevent
unconstitutional state action “was proportionate.” 250 The statute was found to
be disproportionate for targeting neutral state laws that would have been
upheld under Smith, 251 for the lack of evidence of widespread religious
discrimination it was supposed to remedy, 252 and for the burdens it placed on
traditional state functions. 253
Jeremy Waldron has provocatively characterized the kind of “dialogue”
exemplified by Flores as analogous to Ring Lardner’s dialogue from The
Young Immigrunts:
Are you lost daddy I arsked tenderly
Shut up, he explained. 254

This captures the Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy in the place of
any attempt to grapple with the possibility that Congress could be correct as a
244
245
246

247
248

249
250
251
252
253
254

Id. at 529.
Id. at 517.
See McConnell, supra note 229, at 176, 183 (arguing that the legislative history relied on by the City
of Boerne v. Flores Court supports only that “Congress was not intended to have authority to pass
general legislation determining what the privileges and immunities of citizens should be”)
Flores, 521 U.S. at 520–24.
See McConnell, supra note 229, at 165 (arguing that the Court’s refusal to explain the “grounds for
[the] disagreement or why Congress was mistaken” closed the door on the possibility of congressional
interpretation of the clause).
Flores, 521 U.S. at 532.
Id. at 533.
Id. at 532.
Id. at 530–32.
Id. at 533–35.
Waldron, supra note 187, at 45 (citing Ring W. Lardner, THE YOUNG IMMIGRUNTS Ch. 10 (1920)).
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matter of interpreting the Free Exercise Clause. But it may also catch the fit
between this one-sided conversation and the concept of rights informing the
proportionality analysis conducted in the wake of the Court’s assertion of
exclusive interpretive authority.
Flores’s use of proportionality analysis allowed the Court to skirt directly
engaging with the interpretation of the scope of free exercise rights articulated
in RFRA. The Court assessed the proportionality of Congress’ judgment in
RFRA that the free exercise of religion deserves heightened protection, even
in facially neutral laws that seriously burden religious practices. Congress
prioritized rights-as-trumps over the value of a degree of policy discretion for
itself and the states. The Court denied Congress the power to prioritize rightsas-trumps for the states, and then judged that the value of the states’
“traditional general regulatory power” outweighed how RFRA could realize
the value of its own view of the Free Exercise Clause. 255 If the Court had
counter-factually adopted a rights-as-trumps approach, it could deny Congress
the power to articulate the scope of free exercise and then proceed to reiterate
why, even if it did have this power, the scope of the right articulated in RFRA’s
was an interpretive mistake. Instead, proportionality analysis enabled the
Court to interrogate Congress’ view of free exercise as a mistaken judgment
about the value of free exercise as it relates to the value of federalism.
One Canadian and one American example of dialogue certainly does not
provide definitive insight into how proportionality reasoning affect interactions
between courts and legislatures about rights. These examples do suggest that
the conceptual devaluations and distortions of rights-as-proportionality can
have negative institutional effects on the ability of courts and legislatures to
democratically negotiate the meaning of rights.
In the Canadian context, there are less arduous formal institutional
barriers to a Parliament featuring a majority government in the House of
Commons articulating its own understanding of Charter rights in disagreement
with prior judicial decisions. Yet the use of proportionality analysis in Carter
created an obstacle to a majority government attempting to enforce a Supreme
Court judgment. And a Quebec court recently invalidated Parliament’s
attempt to restrict assisted suicide to individuals with a reasonably foreseeable
death as a disproportionate infringement on the right announced in Carter. 256

255
256

Flores, 521 U.S. at 534.
Truchon c. Canada (Procureur Générale), [2019] C.S. 3792, para. 587 (Can. Q. C.S.).
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That casts a shadow over claims that proportionality encourages courts to
listen to legislative deliberation about rights and legislatures to take
responsibility for such deliberation.
In the American context, the Supreme Court made a clear statement about
the scope of the free exercise right as a limited trump in Smith, and thereby
left room for Congress to disagree and articulate an alternative interpretation
of that right in RFRA. 257 This indicates that judicial refusals to balance rights
can promote legislative responsibility for rights, even where legislation such as
RFRA can face potential opposition from the executive and the judiciary. The
use of proportionality reasoning in Flores to shut down engagement with a
strong Congressional articulation of rights does not support the claims of
American proponents of rights-as-proportionality.
The interrogative quality of Carter and Flores orient dialogues towards the
question of whether the legislature has learned to properly balance the value
of rights, and judicial values must have the last word. That’s not exactly a
recipe for democratic negotiations about the scope and nature of rights. Given
the admirable concern for the need to democratically settle reasonable
disagreements about rights among proportionality’s proponents, the Canadian
experience with proportionality analysis should serve as a warning rather than
an exemplar.
V. TWO CONSTRUCTIVE LESSONS
This Article has argued that proportionality analysis can devalue and
distort rights in ways that disrupt democracy. This does not show that
American rights jurisprudence is wholly afflicted with proportionality analysis,
but it does point out how strands of proportionality style reasoning are
responsible for the devaluation and distortion of some U.S. constitutional
rights—even if such reasoning is not explicitly deployed in a uniform doctrine
resembling the Canadian Oakes test. It shows how the Canadian
proportionality approach to rights is much less exemplary of treating rights
reasonably than many Americans may think. This Article does not develop
an alternative vision for how American rights jurisprudence might better
protect rights while realizing the democratic settlement of moral disagreements
that implicate rights. However, the comparison between American and
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Emp. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 889 (1990).
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Canadian rights jurisprudence does suggest two important constructive lessons
for both countries.
The first lesson is that treating rights as absolute relations of justice that
cannot be overridden is compatible with democratic legislatures helping to
establish their scope in the face of moral disagreement about such rights. Not
only are statutory rights conceivable as absolute moral rights, they tend to be
quite institutionally secure against all branches of the state but the legislature. 258
This should be clear to students of the Westminster constitutionalism, as
disagreement about rights in systems featuring Parliamentary sovereignty are
resolved by statutes that are fairly immune to changes or overrides by judicial
and bureaucratic officials. 259 This is why even fundamental rights, such as U.K.
citizens’ right to vote, can be conceived of as morally absolute. Their
constitutive statutory requirements cannot be overridden without being
formally changed, 260 but remain subject to reasonable disagreement about their
scope in certain cases, 261 and only institutionally subject to change by the
Queen-in-Parliament.
If an adult U.K. citizen fulfills and follows the statutory requirements
qualifying them to vote for a Member of Parliament in their constituency, their
right is morally and institutionally secured against being ‘infringed’ or changed
by a judge or elections official in the name of the general welfare. 262 Their
specified right also remains morally absolute against democratic changes given
widespread political commitment to its protection, even while it is
institutionally not absolute against such changes enacted by the U.K.
Parliament. 263 This idea that statutory provisions can establish morally absolute
258
259
260

YOWELL, supra note 1, at 25.
Id. at 26.
See, e.g., Representation of the People Act 1983, c.2, § 3 (Eng.) (“A convicted person during the
time that he is detained in a penal institution in pursuance to his sentence is legally incapable of voting
at any parliamentary or local government election.” (emphasis added)).

261

262

263

Cf. Hirst v. United Kingdom (No.2), 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 849 (2005) (finding the U.K.’s blanket ban on
prisoner voting violated the European Convention on Human Rights’ Article 3 right to free elections).
The decision did not invalidate the impugned statute, but it did spark a debate about prisoner voting
in the U.K. that has not yet been resolved.
Geoffrey Sigalet, Proportionality’s Reductio Ad Monitum, 23 REV. CONST. STUD. 341, 347–48
(2018) (citing YOWELL, supra note 1, at 25) (describing the example in common law jurisdictions of
a Conservation Officer being disallowed from violating a fisherman’s right to fish in the name of the
general welfare).
See generally BELLAMY, supra note 181, at 3–4 (arguing that in working democracies, the effort to
constrain rights in reference to those outlined in written constitutions ignore the natural development
of rights as contained in the political process).
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rights tends to escape Canadians suffering from pre-1982 amnesia and
Americans overly keen on contrasting statutory and constitutional law.
Elevating the moral and democratic importance of statutory rights provisions
is much more consistent with the Anglo-American tradition of
constitutionalism than denigrating the justice of constitutional rights by
subjecting them to proportionate statutory infringements.
The second lesson is that in order to settle moral disagreements about
rights more democratically, it is necessary for courts to countenance statutes
as potentially specifying the absolute scope and nature of constitutional rights.
This may seem a bridge too far given the axiom of constitutionalism that
entrenched constitutional rights are not subject to change by ordinary statutes.
We need not abandon a commitment to constitutionalism to admit that
entrenched rights are often vague and underspecified two term jural relations
of the form “A has the right to X.” 264 Statutory rights often have a three term
jural relation between a right-holder A, an action φ, and B, a person or set of
persons with no right to interfere with A’s right. 265 That enables them to help
resolve the finer points of moral disagreements about the scope of vague
constitutional rights. 266 And if we admit that ordinary statutes can articulate
morally absolute rights with democratic input, then it seems reasonable that
statutes can help construct the meaning of fundamental rights.
In the contexts of the American and Canadian constitutional bills of rights,
recognizing statutory rights constructions will involve judicial review. Judicial
review of the constitutionality of statutory rights is actually necessary to help
distinguish purely statutory rights from those bearing on the scope of
entrenched rights, while also remedying violations of such rights. 267 This is
aptly demonstrated by RFRA, which required the co-ordinate participation of
the judiciary to protect a Congressional articulation of free exercise rights. 268
But this second lesson is incompatible with the Canadian and American
Supreme Courts’ occasional claims to judicial supremacy, such as the
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YOWELL, supra note 1, at 25–26.
Id. at 26.
See generally WEBBER ET AL., supra note 177, at 125–42.
See Sigalet, supra note 262, at 355–56 (“Adjudication helps make such ordinary legal rights more
specific and absolute by using legal techniques of reasoning to apply their meaning across different
parties and empirical facts.”).
See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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American Supreme Court’s declaration in Boerne that it is the exclusive
interpreter of constitutional rights. 269
Sharing interpretive power is constitutionally sound because both the U.S.
Constitution’s Article VI and the Constitution Act, 1982, Section 52 require
the supremacy of their respective constitutions, and neither grants any
institution absolute authority over what the constitutions demands. 270 And
even judicial declarations of judicial supremacy such as Boerne’s are often
belied by future judicial decisions accepting legislative constructions of rights
at odds with precedent. 271 Extra-judicial constitutional construction is a legal
and political reality in both American 272 and Canadian constitutional law. 273
Coordinating the construction of constitutional rights between the branches
also follows James Madison’s argument in The Federalist No. 37 that legally
vague constitutional provisions should be “liquidated” or constructed by
“series” of both legislative “discussions” and judicial “adjudications.” 274
269

270

271

272

273

274

See, e.g., Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 (Stevens, J. concurring) (“When the political branches of the
Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already
issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents
with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary
expectations must be disappointed.”); Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [2002] 3 S.C.R.
519, para. 17 (Can.) (“The healthy and important promotion of a dialogue between the legislature
and the courts should not be debased to a rule of ‘if at first you don’t succeed, try, try again’.”).
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (subjecting all branches of the federal and state governments to the
Constitution as “the supreme Law of the Land”). The Constitution Act of 1982 declares the
Constitution of Canada to be the supreme law. Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act, 1982, c I (U.K.).
See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436–39 (2006)
(upholding an injunction under RFRA prohibiting the federal government from prosecuting a
religious sect under facially neutral statutory provisions for using sacramental hallucinogenic tea
because it lacked a “compelling interest”).
See, e.g., Keith E. Whittington, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation: Three Objections and
Responses, 80 N.C. L. REV. 773 (2002); Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular Constitutionalism,
Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (2004); LARRY KRAMER, THE
PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); GREG
WEINER, THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTION (2019).
See, e.g., DENNIS BAKER, NOT QUITE SUPREME (2010); CHRISTOPHER MANFREDI, JUDICIAL
POWER AND THE CHARTER (2d ed. 2001).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 183 (James Madison). For a more complete account of Madison’s
departmentalist ideal of such “liquidation,” see generally Will Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71
STAN. L. REV. 1 (2019) (explaining the concept of constitutional liquidation to provide an
understanding of the role of history in constitutional law). For other similar accounts of constitutional
construction, see KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 5–14 (1999);
Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction 27 CONST. COMMENT. 95 (2011).
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Together, these lessons indicate that a more democratic rights
jurisprudence will recognize statutes as sources constructing the scope and
nature of just rights, without giving up the judicial role of remedying violations
of rights in particular cases and circumstances. How exactly this should
influence the doctrines of American and Canadian rights jurisprudence is well
beyond the scope of this article. There are a number of adjudicative methods
and sources of law that might be used to better integrate statutes into the
construction of constitutional rights. And there is no reason why evidence of
the original meaning, longstanding practices implicating rights, precedent
setting judicial decisions and statutes, and even moral reasoning concerning
rights cannot all help legislatures and courts specify the morally absolute scope
of constitutional rights. 275 Reforming the way courts and legislatures approach
rights to respect the moral absoluteness of rights while relaxing the institutional
absoluteness of judicial decisions about rights promises to be a complex task.
Courts, legislators, and scholars undertaking this complicated task run the
risk of legally warping reasonable moral disagreements about rights, but this is
simply one of the risks of constitutionally entrenching rights as fundamental
law. The risk inherent in reconciling the many principles, methods, and types
of evidence available to delimit entrenched rights is offset by the reward of
democratically protecting the morally valuable rights entrenched in a
constitution. That being said, it’s worth dealing with the pragmatic objection
to the task of reforming rights jurisprudence along the lines I have suggested.
Perhaps U.S. proponents of proportionality will seize on and defend some
of the cases of balancing this paper has traced to strands of American rights
jurisprudence. They may object that extricating balancing will require radically
uprooting the compelling interest test in strict scrutiny cases, or, following the
proposal of Justice Thomas’ and other commentators, trashing the tiers of
scrutiny altogether. 276 Canadian commentators may similarly object to
reforming the proportionality framework embodied in Oakes. It is possible
to respond to these criticisms by biting the bullet and arguing for overturning
the tiers of scrutiny and Oakes. Even so, recent Canadian jurisprudence
indicates that it is plausible to renovate doctrines entangled in proportionality
style reasoning so that they guide courts to reason about the content and scope
of absolute rights. This suggests that opponents of proportionality may not
275
276

Michael W. McConnell, Time, Institutions, and Interpretation, 95 B.U. L. REV. 1745 (2015).
See Whole Woman’s Health v Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328 (2016) (Thomas J., dissenting)
(“[Tiers of scrutiny] labels now mean little.”).
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need to advocate outright opposition to the tiers of scrutiny to curtail the
disruption of rights.
In the recent case of Frank v. Canada, the majority of the Canadian
Supreme Court balked at Justices Côté and Brown’s questioning the Oakes
test’s legacy of conflating the constitutionality of “limitations” with potentially
“justified infringements” of rights. 277 But, as Justices Côté and Brown’s dissent
in Frank makes elegantly clear, even the minimal impairment and balancing
steps of the Oakes test could be renovated to justify how reasonable a court’s
judgment about the scope of a right is. 278 They look to the statutory means of
restricting the right to vote to citizens residing in Canada for five-years and,
rather than attempting to justify this restriction as an infringement of rights,
they find reasons why it is a reasonable means “to define and shape the
boundaries of a positive entitlement which, as such, necessarily requires
legislative specification.” 279
This would reorient the Oakes inquiry towards establishing why the
legislation specifies the scope of the right rather than violating it. In cases
where rights are violated, the minimal impairment and proportionality prongs
could be similarly subverted away from attempting to justify an infringement,
and towards supporting the reasons why legislation violates the scope of a right.
If Oakes could be reformed, then so too could American strands of
proportionality style reasoning. The variegated American approach could be
reformed by breathing new life into the kind of tradition oriented test for
establishing the scope of due process rights in Washington v. Glucksberg, and
extending this to other rights. 280 Instead of rejecting the tiers of scrutiny, the
Court could emphasize how governmental interests in limiting rights must help
specify the scope and boundaries of rights. The live question concerning the
scope of the Second Amendment right to bear arms at stake in New York
State Rifle & Pistol Association Ltd. v. New York was held to be rendered
moot by New York State amending its firearms licensing statute and New York
City loosening its restrictions on firearms transportation. 281 But Justice Alito’s
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Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1 at paras. 120–125 (Côté, J. and Brown J.,
dissenting).
Id. at paras. 160–172.
Id. at para. 124.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020).
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dissent (and Justice Kavanaugh’s concurrence) show that similar future cases
could become a chance for the Court to explain how a government’s interest
in restricting the transportation of handguns can or cannot be found in the
“text, history, and tradition” defining the scope of the Second Amendment
right. 282
When inquiring into the City’s justification for restricting the
transportation of firearms to second homes or shooting ranges outside of the
City, Justice Alito rejected both historical and public interest arguments. 283
Interestingly, Justice Alito starts his analysis by reviewing Heller’s holding
about how the scope of the right to bear arms extends to the right to keep a
handgun in the home for self-defense, and to transport such guns for
maintenance, lawfully transferring ownership, and “to gain and maintain the
skill necessary to use it responsibly.” 284 He then turns to the historical evidence
in the founding era for laws that prevented gun-owners from practicing outside
of city limits. The City argued that founding era municipalities restricted the
places firearms could be used within their jurisdiction, but Justice Alito
dismisses this because the petitioners were claiming the “right to practice at
ranges and competitions outside the City, and neither the City, the courts
below, nor any of the many amici supporting the City have shown that
municipalities during the founding era prevented gun owners from taking their
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 3, N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525
(2020). Consider what might have happened if the case had not been rendered moot. On the one
hand, it could have made strategic sense for Justice Breyer et al. to argue that the original textual
meaning, history, and tradition of the Second Amendment compel deference because they are
sufficiently indeterminate regarding whether blanket bans on the transportation of short-barreled
weapons would have been understood to violate the right to bear arms. This would be presumably
more acceptable to several of his fellow justices than repeating his balancing argument in Heller. On
the other hand, Justice Kavanaugh et al. might be tempted to find new evidence for why handgun
transportation bans might have been unacceptable at the founding, or, perhaps more promisingly, at
the time of the Reconstruction Amendments that incorporate the Second Amendment against the
states. Note that in the sequel to Heller, then-Judge Kavanaugh, considering an automatic weapons
ban at the D.C. Circuit, explicitly argued that Heller bound lower courts with the implicit “clear
message” that “[c]ourts should not apply strict or intermediate scrutiny but should instead look to
text, history, and tradition to define the scope of the right and assess gun bans and regulations.”
Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J.,
dissenting).
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, 140 S. Ct. at 1544 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1541.
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guns outside city limits for practice.” 285 He finally looks to the “public safety”
arguments and finds them facially weak and unsubstantiated. 286
Justice Alito’s reasoning appears to be primarily informed by rights-astrumps, but some questions remain concerning his inquiry into the public
safety justification. The way he defines the scope of the rights eschews the
proportionality approach of treating the right to bear arms as an overridable
interest that extends to all examples of citizens having their use of firearms
restricted by law. And his historical inquiry appears oriented towards
establishing the scope of the right to transfer arms as it related to
municipalities.
But his public safety analysis may leave room for the City to justifiably
violate the (presumptively) historically determinate right to transfer arms given
the proper demonstration that travel restrictions promoted public safety. In
order for the Court to avoid using heightened scrutiny as a kind of balancing
inquiry, arguments such as the public safety justification must be blended into
the analysis of the text, history, and tradition establishing the scope of the right.
This wouldn’t be hard to do. For example, Justice Alito could have noted that
in order for public interest justifications to be on the table, the City must show
that these were historically acceptable grounds for municipalities to restrict
travel with firearms in the founding or reconstruction eras. Given the historical
question marks over Heller surveyed in Part III above, this approach might
also give the City and Justice Breyer much to say in response.
Outside of the Second Amendment, the Court could also turn away from
proportionality style reasoning by reversing its increasing trend of using its
compelling interest analysis to uphold violations of rights such as freedom of
speech, 287 and instead use it to explain why various asserted government
interests fail to exempt a statutory provision or regulation from the scope of a
right.
It’s difficult to see how such reforms are more radical than moving towards
the example of the majority of the Canadian Supreme Court in Frank. The
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Id.
Id. at 1544.
See, e.g., Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1662 (2015) (upholding speech
restrictions on fundraising by state judicial candidates); Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S.
Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010) (upholding speech restrictions on provision of material support to international
terrorist organizations).
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majority in Frank found basic statutory qualifications on the right to vote such
as residency requirements to be infringements of that right in need of
philosophical justification. The right to vote existed in Canada before the
1982 patriation of the Charter and its section 3 enumeration of the right. The
pre-1982 statutory right to vote was constituted by laws specifying the very
kinds of qualifications that the Court now unreasonably views as
“infringements.” 288
CONCLUSION
Arguments for reforming American rights jurisprudence to incorporate
proportionality analysis seek the goals of better valuing rights and clarifying
disagreements about rights for the betterment of democracy. These goals are
clearly admirable. But introducing or expanding the role of proportionality
analysis into the way American courts analyze rights questions may prove an
unreasonable means of achieving these interests. Canadian eyes may see more
clearly where such means will lead, and the view isn’t pretty for those with a
healthy distaste for rights inflation, unaccountable judicial law-making, and bad
faith dialogues about rights between elected officials and judges. The means
are not so much disproportionate to these ends as inimical to them.
The silver lining is that thinking through why proportionality analysis is
unlikely to “lower the stakes of politics” provides us with basic insights about
how to reform Canadian and American rights adjudication to more
democratically protect the value of rights and the clarity of our disagreements
about them. 289 Courts must treat rights as morally absolute, but democratically
accommodate disagreements about the scope of their obligatory requirements
by institutionally recognizing legislative and traditional sources of meaning.
The need for these lessons would not surprise H. L. A. Hart, who once noted
that the two most remarkable aspects of American jurisprudence for the
English lawyer are the U.S. Supreme Court’s declaration of its power to
invalidate Congressional statutes and its doctrine of finding procedurally
sound laws to be invalid violations of due process because they “did not satisfy
the requirement of vague undefined standards of reasonableness or

288
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Dominion Elections Act, S.C. 1920, c. 46 (Can.).
Greene, supra note 2, at 80.
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desirability.” 290 He found these phenomena “hard to justify in a democracy.” 291
Proportionality analysis makes it even harder to justify the legitimacy of
constitutional judicial review. Clipping back proportionality judgments may
make it easier.
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HART, supra note 15, at 124–125.
Id. at 125.
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